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ABSTRACT 
CAPITAL/LABOR SUBSTITUTION AND FACTOR PRICE RATIOS 
IN A MILITARY SERVICE: A STUDY OF 
DEFENSE RESOURCE ALLOCATION 
By Rolf H. Clark, E.S., Yale University 
M.S., Naval Post Graduate School 
Ph.D., University of Massachusetts 
Directed by: Dr, William B. Whiston 
While some analysts claim U.S. Defense systems should 
become more capital intensive to offset rising labor costs, 
others feel they are already too sophisticated for the De¬ 
fense labor force. The research has three goals, which 
help clarify this division. First, capital/labor ratios as 
indicators of Defense efficiency are oriented within exist¬ 
ing capital accumulation theory. Second, models are de¬ 
veloped which are consistent with this theory. Third, the 
parameters of these models are estimated using U.S. Navy 
budget and asset data. An attempt is then made at synthe¬ 
sizing the two divergent viewpoints in light of the research 
models and findings. 
The theoretical issues discussed include stocks versus 
flows in capital valuation, the pricing of input factors, 
the consistency of pricing and capital valuation in Defense, 
the embodiment of technical change in new systems, the use¬ 
fulness of marginal utility when output is not measurable, 
Vll 
and the effects of cost estimating errors,.especially biases 
toward undercosting one factor relatively more than the 
other. 
The findings include the follov.Ting: (1) both Defense 
capital and manpower costs are underestimated by approxi- 
mately 30%, thus cost bias may be insignificant. The impli¬ 
cations of upsetting this balance through new policies such 
as a salary pay system are discussed. (2) Shifts toward 
higher capital intensity are evident in new systems, but 
because of the low and decreasing ratio of new to total de¬ 
fense hardware, changes in overall capital labor ratios have 
reacted slowly. Finding (2) is presented by comparing sub¬ 
stitution elasticity for new versus total systems, and forms 
the basis for synthesizing the two views on proper capital 
accumulation. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background: Divergent Viewpoint on Capital/Labor 
Ratios in Defense 
Recent literature has made reference to the tradeoff 
between aggregate capital and labor as input factors in na¬ 
tional defense [6], [10], [18]. The present research will 
explore the use of capital-to-labor ratios as a means of 
evaluating internal defense economic policy over time. 
Aggregation of factors is common in economics, with 
efficiency resulting from the equating of marginal revenue 
and marginal cost—the first order conditions of common op¬ 
timization problems. This concept cannot be directly trans 
ferred to defense resource allocation. One very basic rea¬ 
son is that defense activity lacks a quantitative output 
measure [18, p. 248]. Therefore marginal productivity, and 
similar concepts, lose much of their practical meaning. 
Yet marginal trade-offs and their relation to effi¬ 
ciency are so well engrained in economic thinking that the 
concept is difficult to avoid in defense analysis. Some¬ 
times observers imply that shifts toward capital intensity 
are appropriate, and sometimes the opposite is encouraged. 
1.1.1 Some analysts favor greater capital intensity. 
Cooper and Rolls, in very preliminary but relevant work, im 
ply that a future trend toward capital intensity may be ap- 
2 
propriate to match an apparent recent rise in labor costs 
relative to capital [10]. Other sources have drawn less 
guarded conclusions. A staff member of the Defense Manpower 
Commission, a joint Congressional/Executive body conducting 
a two year study of defense manpower utilization and needs, 
has recently stated the personal opinion that shifts away 
from labor intensity in the armed services is an obvious 
future policy to gain efficiency [59]. In a widely read 
Brookings Institution publication four prestigious econo¬ 
mists draw a questionable conclusion, which they base on 
rising percentages of manpower per combat unit in the 1964- 
74 timefrane [17, p. 300]: 
The point here is...to emphasize that at the 
very time the price of military manpower is 
rising sharply, it is being used more, rather 
than less, intensively. Thus the change in 
the use of defense manpower has reinforced, 
rather than partly offset, the effect of 
higher pay on the defense budget. 
While the immediate point here is that an aggregate capital/ 
labor ratio is the basis for the implication made, the ob¬ 
served inconsistency is likely to be caused by something 
other than the use of manpower. One example is that rising 
costs and budget ceilings caused cutbacks in combat units 
(e.g. ships and aircraft) which could not be matched, for 
contractual reasons, with manpower cutbacks. This would 
cause temporary manpower excesses until new, more capital 
intensive equipment could replace the weapon stock. Other 
explanations are also possible, depending on the underlying 
circumstances. 
1.1.2 Others favor more labor intensity, While the 
above references indicate that a shift toward capital intens 
ity is appropriate, others seem to argue the opposite. Some 
naval officers interviewed claim that much of the new equip¬ 
ment arriving in the fleet is too sophisticated for the aver 
age operator and/or repairman, and that less complex (and 
presumably therefore less capital intensive) systems would 
be more effective overall. Defense analyst Harry Gilman 
states there is some evidence that "...the Administration 
and Congress are subject to continuous pressure to develop 
capital intensive systems," [18, p. 250], Murray Wiedenbaum 
in his recent book The Economics of Peacetime Defense ob¬ 
serves that systems become more complex than necessary [57, 
pp. 57-62] . He shows that high system costs are often due 
to demands for excessive sophistication of weapon systems 
by military planners. Critizing unnecessary "gold-plating" 
of weapon systems, Wiedenbaum summarizes colorfully by quot¬ 
ing Lewis Carroll's Through the Looking Glass. Alice is 
surprised at the equipment carried by the White Knight: 
"But you've got a beehive... fastened to the 
saddle... I was wondering what the mouse¬ 
trap was for," said Alice. "It isn't very 
likely there would be any mice on the 
horse's back." 
"Not very likely, perhaps," said the 
Knight, "but if they dcq come, I don't choose 
to have them running all about." "You see," 
he went on after a pause, "it's well to 
be provided for everything. That's the req- 
son the horse has those anklets around his 
feet...to guard against the bites of sharks." 
1.1.3 Are the viewpoints really divergent?. There 
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is, of course, the possibility that these two viewpoints are 
not incompatible. Capital intensity, if it comes in the 
form of automation, can lead to the need for less labor in 
both quantity and quality. In that case the shift toward 
capital intensity is accomplished through weapon systems so 
automated that they can be operated by unskilled labor. 
However maintaining and repairing such systems is not likely 
to be achieved by any but very skilled technicians. The 
automation theory becomes, therefore, less than satisfactory 
unless one is willing either to assume such maintenance is 
accomplished outside of the Defense establishment, or that 
systems are so well designed that maintenance requirements 
are low. The former assumption begs the issue rather arti¬ 
ficially. The latter really leads back to the basic capital/ 
labor tradeoff problem, for such maintenance free systems 
only occur at higher cost, and diminishing returns will tend 
to retard movement toward high automation. 
The different viewpoints must, it seems, be explained 
on more basic grounds. Such explanation seems available, 
and rests on the theory that the two sides are looking at 
different things when they evaluate the capital intensities 
of systems, a matter to be returned to very shortly. 
1,1.4 The research objectives. But first, the research 
priorities are becoming reversed, and need to be clarified. 
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While the present research was inspired by the apparent di- 
vergence in opinions on what direction future systems should 
take, resolving the argument is not the purpose of the re¬ 
search. The purpose of the research is analysis, not arbi¬ 
tration. Having completed the analysis, it will seem appro¬ 
priate to comment on the arbitration, and that will be of¬ 
fered in the final chapter. For present purposes, we should 
turn to the more specific goals of the research, of which 
there are three. 
The first is to investigate the validity of using aggre¬ 
gate capital and labor and especially capital-to-labor ra¬ 
tios, as indicators or policy tools for evaluating Defense 
efficiency. This is the concern of Chapter II, and requires 
some discussion of numerous issues in economic capital theo¬ 
ry. The objective will be to orient the models eventually 
selected for analyzing capital/labor trends in Defense. 
These model descriptions, presented in Chapter III, are 
the second task of the research. The models will consider 
two separate issues relating to system acquisition. The 
first is the effect of errors made in costing capital and 
labor input factors. The second is the time dependent trend 
of capital/labor ratios relative to factor price ratios. 
The third task of the research is empirical. In Chapter 
IV available data is analyzed to estimate the principal pa¬ 
rameters of Chapter Ill's models. This analysis is based on 
the data provided in the Appendix. Since the data includes 
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only figures on the U.S. Navy, all results can only be di¬ 
rectly applied to that service. Finally in Chapter V, the 
findings are summarized, and their implications discussed 
in light of some reservations on the validity of the data 
and assumptions. 
1.2 Preview of Results 
1.2.1 Cost bias and factor substitution. There are 
two main findings in Chapter IV. First, cost bias, the 
proportional undercosting of one input factor relative to 
another is not significant--planners seem to estimate both 
capital and labor costs at cipproximately 70% of their true 
cost. The implications of policies which may alter this 
balance in cost bias are discussed in Chapter V. 
The second finding is that if one considers new acqui¬ 
sitions, capital/labor ratios have apparently increased at 
a higher rate than labor/capital cost ratios. In other 
words, if changes in capital/labor ratios of the weapon 
stock must be "embodied" in new acquisitions, then planners 
have indeed been acquiring systems with seemingly high capi¬ 
tal intensity. The "embodied" assumption follows if one 
assumes that systems, once procured, have fixed labor re¬ 
quirements, but that in systems not yet under production 
capital and labor can still be substituted. 
1.2.2 Substitution and the divergent viewpoints again. 
This second result allows a brief return to the arbitration 
7 
matter. If new acquisitions are a very small part of the 
overall budget, then obviously the weapon stock in aggre¬ 
gate, that is old and new systems combined, will not change 
rapidly even though price ratios do. The synthesis of the 
two viewpoints discussed previously can be based on the 
difference between the response of new systems to factor 
price changes and the response of the overall systems to 
these same changes. It may well be the case that those 
arguing for greater capital intensity are looking at the 
aggregate whole, while those claiming over-sophistication 
are looking at the incremental. 
These matters can only be discussed realistically after 
the theory, models, and empiric results, that is the re¬ 
search proper, has been completed. The models of Chapter 
III and the empirics of Chapter IV will be rather straight¬ 
forward, once the theoretical arguments of Chapter II are 
accepted...or at least understood. Some of the theoretical 
matters discussed in that chapter include: the measurement 
of capital; the relevance of marginal utility concepts when 
output is not measureable; the embodiment or disembodiment 
of technology in capital; the type of technical change. 
1.2.3 Some-new data contained in the study. Before 
turning to those issues, some comments on the data appendix 
seem proper. The appendix contains both raw data and the 
raw data adjusted to useable forms for the models of Chapter 
III. There are several data conversions which are believed 
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unique to this study of defense activity. First, manpower 
used by the Navy has been adjusted to reflect the manpower 
required to man systems, rather than the manpower on-hand. 
This is consistent with the need to investigate the capital/ 
labor ratios of systems at full performance of the factors. 
Similarly, Navy weapon systems have been adjusted to reflect 
only their active portions. Such adjustment becomes very 
important in the case of Naval ships; for of the total ship 
value held in the Navy registry, the fraction inaction 
("mothballed") varies from 0.20 to 0.64 over a twenty year 
period. Furthermore, ships make up such a large percentage 
of total Navy assets that ignoring the active/inactive sta¬ 
tus is a serious oversight...afterall, inactive ships have 
no significant manning requirement. A less important but 
still significant adjustment for aircraft active/inactive 
status is also made. 
A third major adjustment to the data is also related 
primarily to ships. In order to speak of weapon stock valued 
in base year terms, the ages of ships contained in that stock 
must be accounted for. This is particularly true since ship 
valuation data is available only in acquisition cost terms, 
and many ships in the data base were acquired long before the 
1955 start of the data series. 
Various other adjustments to the raw data are included. 
In these introductory remarks, however, it is inappropriate 
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to cover more detail. Rather, it seems best to commence 
the detailed explanation of the research in proper sequence, 
and we start with the theory. 
CHAPTER II 
DEFENSE CHARACTERISTICS AND UNDERLYING THEORY 
II.1 Directly Related Literature: A Shortage 
Outside of the still formative work by Cooper and Rolls 
[10], there is little significant empirical work investigat¬ 
ing the aggregate capital/labor trade off in Defense—that 
is for the Defense Department overall.^ This seems surpris¬ 
ing in vieiw of the fact that criticisms of, and support for, 
Defense allocations are so often voiced in aggregate terms 
as was indicated earlier. Even the Cooper and Rolls approach 
is not directly relatable to the present research. In their 
study the cost of capital is based on the interest rate plus 
imputed depreciation, and capital valuation is based on ac¬ 
quisition cost [10, pp. 16,17]. This would be inconsistent 
unless capital valued at acquisition cost happened to equal 
the discounted present value of future output attributed to 
2 
the capital. Furthermore, the interest rate on funds is 
There are numerous studies which investigate factor 
tradeoffs for specific sub-sectors. 
2 
The inconsistency is described in general terms in 
Hick's recent book, Capital and Time [27, Chap. 13]. It must 
be stressed that Cooper and Rolls work is not yet in final 
form, and the above is meant to lend comparison rather than 
voice premature criticism. Furthermore, there are certain 
equilibrium conditions under which the inconsistency disap¬ 
pears. Section II.5 below explores this matter further. 
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not relevant unless funds can be borrowed. We shall argue 
that the Defense Department does not have this option. 
The shortage of even unpublished research into aggre¬ 
gate capital/iabor tradeoffs in Defense had been confirmed 
by discussions with representatives at, among other agencies, 
the Institute for Defense Analysis, the Center for Naval An¬ 
alysis, the Office of Naval Research, the Brookings Institu¬ 
tion, and the Rand Corporation. Dr. Jacob Stockfisch, pre¬ 
viously an economist for Defense Secretary McNamara and now 
with Rand, has stated in a recent conversation that use is 
often made implicitly of an aggregate defense production 
function in the conclusions of defense analysts, and that 
research to investigate the validity of such functions and 
conclusions was needed [54]. 
There are three probable reasons for this literature 
shortage. First, those most familiar with defense problems 
are concerned with the pressing implementation aspects of 
defense management, and aggregate considerations seem im¬ 
practical. Second, economists seem to ignore defense mat- 
3 
ters. Sumner Rosen, in a scathing critique of present-day 
economists in general, states: 
We can conclude this survey with the most 
important abdication of any of the econo¬ 
mists. This is a failure which applies 
across the board: the theoreticians, the 
3 
A review of the titles of last year’s doctoral disser¬ 
tations listed in the December 1974 American Economic Review 
indicates one dissertation out of over 800 was directly con- 
cerned with defense matters. 
institutionalists and the aggregative econ¬ 
omists alike have virtually ignored the 
most important single force in the American 
economy of the past twenty-five years, war 
and preparation for war [43, p. 413]. 
This academic neglect may be caused by the previously men¬ 
tioned non-measurability of output. This confounds many 
economic theories, especially those concerned with optimi¬ 
zation. 
A third reason for the neglect may be that the talent 
which has been applied has been aimed largely at systems an¬ 
alysis, operations research, and the like, rather than at 
broader economic issues.^ This may have led to suboptimal 
short term solutions at the cost of long term economy. One 
advantage of aggregate considerations is that they provide 
a perspective for viewing these more detailed analyses. 
II.2 Indirectly Related Literature: an Abundance 
While economic research directly applicable to internal 
Defense analysis may be less than abundant, it is not the 
case that economists have failed to provide the basis for 
such analysis. The classical debates in economics are clas¬ 
sical because they are so pervasive. It would be strange 
indeed if an economic organization as capital-laden as the 
Defense Department was immune from the continuing arguments 
^There is a vast literature in these operations research 
areas. Some widely held texts containing general discussions 
on Defense are [14], [29], [42]. 
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in capital theory. In the remainder of this chapter the 
groundwork will be laid for the models presented in Chapter 
III. This will be based on familiar economic thoughts. 
While the immediate purpose is to justify the model used 
herein, the following discussions should help other re¬ 
searchers analyze Defense resource allocations based on var¬ 
iant assumptions—there is no reason the data accumulated 
in the appendix must be forced into any specific model. 
Any model chosen should be consistent with the existing 
defense institution and its constraints. Collating the 
available economic models with these constraints is the next 
task. When completed, there will be some weaknesses remain¬ 
ing—but at least the weaknesses should be explicit, and de¬ 
tailed extensions or modifications should thereby be facili¬ 
tated. 
II.3 Cost Bias and Factor Substitution—Two 
Separable Problems 
There will be twTo basic models discussed in Chapter III, 
with related hypotheses tested in Chapter IV. The first con¬ 
cerns cost bias, which is the tendency to undercost one fac¬ 
tor of production proportionately more than another. The 
second concerns the proper substitution of one factor for an¬ 
other (given such substitution is technologically feasible 
and economically signaled by factor price changes and/or tech- 
14 
5 
nical progress). This second issue is normally discussed 
under the implicit assumption that the factor prices used 
are the true factor prices. There are reasons why this 
may not be the case in Defense allocations. 
This chapter will concentrate on providing a background 
discussion. Mathematical presentations of those matters 
pertaining directly to the research will be reserved for 
Chapter III. 
111,3*1 Factors may be incorrectly costed in Defense— 
the cost bias problem. First, on the capital side, the De¬ 
fense Department does not principally buy existing ("off- 
the-shelf") items. Rather, it contracts for new weapon sys¬ 
tems which have yet to be developed. Obviously a contractor 
estimating the ultimate cost of equipment he has not provided 
before is less likely to be accurate than if he had already 
X^roduced the system. Second, such systems are delivered 
years after the initial contracts are negotiated. This long 
time span allows further errors between the expected and ul¬ 
timate costs of hardware systems, even if inflation is ab¬ 
stracted. 
On the labor side, military compensation schemes are 
generally more complex than their corporate counterparts. 
Instead of wages and salaries (plus certain annuity funds) 
c. 
The terms "technical progress" and "technological pro¬ 
gress" are used interchangeably in the literature. Here we 
stay with the term used by Hahn and Matthews in their compre¬ 
hensive survey of growth theory [20]. 
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accounting for essentially the total ccst of labor, the nil 
itary labor ccst is cloaked in housing, medical, and retire 
nent benefits which often are not paid coincident with the 
labor utilization.0 A retirement annuity paid by a firm 
this year fcr a current worker*s ultimate retirement is cif 
ficult to ignore as a labor cost. Eut a retirement check t 
be delivered by the Defense Department 20 years frcm nov fo 
a current worker is easily ignored. 
It is therefore reasonable to expect significant error 
in estimating the "pricer cf labor and capital which will 
apply when system delivery occurs. Evidence shews such er- 
7 
rors tend toward under- rather than over-pricing. It is 
important to investigate not only the magnitude of such un¬ 
derpricing, but also the tendency to underprice cre factor 
proportionately more than another...which is herein called 
cost bias. 
The costing errors discussed here are those concerned 
with accounting costs. We are not discussing divergence be 
tween accounting and ’"real' or "opportunity" costs. The 
latter concept will be discussed further below. Fcr the 
^See Binkin [5], fcr a discussion of military compen¬ 
sation complexity'. 
7 
Such conclusions are evident in the studies doer* at 
Harvard by Scherer [45, p. 27], by Peck and Scherer [4G, 
Chapter 16], and in the periodic reports to Congress by 
the General Accounting Office, e.g. [61], [62], [63,], [64] 
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present, the above arguments should explain the need for 
what will become the "cost bias" model in Chapter III. 
In that chapter it will become evident from the model 
equations that the cost bias problem is mathematically sep¬ 
arable from the more intricate problem of factor substitu¬ 
tion over time. This latter problem will be called the "sub¬ 
stitution problem," and will be the concern of the second 
model in Chapter III and the second hypothesis of Chapter IV. 
The remainder of this chapter wTill be devoted to trying to 
sort out the issues involved in modeling this time-phased 
relationship between labor and capital in the Defense con¬ 
text-conditioned on the assumption that cost bias has been 
removed. 
II.4 The Substitution Problem 
The model developed to analyze factor ratios over time 
will involve such economic issues as fiscal decentralization, 
the form of capital accumulation, the elasticity of factor 
substitution, and the type of technical progress. The even¬ 
tual model will show the Defense Department as an agency 
controlled by society through decentralization. It will be 
% 
characterized by "ex-ante substitutability/ex-post fixed 
proportion" (putty-clay) capital accumulation. Furthermore, 
changes in factor ratios will be embodied in new acquisi¬ 
tions. These issues will be discussed separately. 
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II.4.1 DoD and society, a case of decentralization 
through capital rationing. The research is concerned with 
the effectiveness of economic decisions within the DoD (De¬ 
partment of Defense). Society’s effectiveness in allocating 
to Dod, as exercised through Congress, is not investigated 
per se. Confusion results if that distinction is not kept 
clear. For example, the fact that society determines the 
compensation to a recruit to be $X per month when the same 
recruit's opportunity cost (what he could produce elsewhere) 
is $Y does not mean DoD should use $Y as the cost of a re¬ 
cruit to Dod ... it means society should use $Y in determin¬ 
ing the cost of a recruit to society. 
In essence, DoD is a decentralized agency. It makes 
decisions on system acquisitions subject to constraints 
placed on it by Congress. The constraints take the form of 
manpower ceilings, appropriations limits, various limita¬ 
tions on weapon types, etc. Given some output measure and 
objective function, it would be theoretically feasible (and 
very desirable) to optimize output subject to the imposed 
o 
constraints. Unfortunately, it is difficult to find objec¬ 
tive functions for Defense—even more devastating is the 
o 
Such an optimization process in a linear form is de¬ 
scribed in Weingartner1s seminal work [56], with further in¬ 
sights added by Baumol and Quandt [3], Carleton [8], and 
Carleton, Kendall and Tandon [9]. Nonlinear treatments are 
also possible. See Kirk [34] for a general treatment of 
optimization. 
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fact that output is not even measurable, a matter which per¬ 
vades the analysis and dictates the approach taken. 
Continuing with the enumeration of DoD’s constraints, 
it is assumed that DoD budgets, imposed through appropria¬ 
tion authorizations, are fixed in real terms once approved. 
Furthermore DoD cannot borrow or lend funds on the money 
market to modify the phasing of these appropriations. Thus, 
9 
a fairly pure form of "capital rationing" is in effect. 
"Real terms" are specified because Congress essentially sup¬ 
plements defense appropriations to compensate for unexpected 
cost increases imposed on DoD—-as it did to compensate for 
the pay increases in 1968. Defense programs suffering due 
to unexpected general inflation are normally supplemented as 
well. Of course new obligational authority (NOA) will suf¬ 
fer as a result of these supplemental needs, but that effect 
is internalized in the proposed models. 
II.4.2 The treatment of inflation. Amplification of 
this treatment of inflation seems appropriate. The central 
fact is that unlike more autonomous organizations,"^ the de- 
q 
The implications of capital rationing, particularly on 
the cost of capital as an opportunity cost and therefore on 
capital valuation is provided in Burton and Damon, who state 
"Our main result is a proof that the cost of capital for... 
[pure capital rationing]... is not well defined and is a mean 
ingless concept." [7, p. 1165]. Capital valuation will be 
discussed further in Section II.5. 
■^Such organizations can, for example, borrow funds now 
if they foresee high interest rates. DoD does not have this 
option. 
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centralized DoD is not (and perhaps can not be) held re¬ 
sponsible for inflationary effects. This results from the 
capital rationing concept characteristic of decentralized 
agencies. More specifically. Congress approves the defense 
budget based on an expected inflation rate. If subsequently 
an unexpected higher inflation rate occurs. Congress supple¬ 
ments the DoD budget to offset resulting cost increases. 
The mechanisms for doing this are the supplemental budget 
12 
requests DoD (and other agencies) submit toward year end. 
Since planners should be evaluated based on foreseeable 
events, and since economy-wide or even world-wide inflation 
are not matters controllable by DoD, it is important to ab¬ 
stract inflaction from the study. In fact, if DoD foresaw 
inflation, it could not act to plan for it anyway. This 
peculiar situation can be emphasized as resulting from the 
capital rationing environment by considering the negative 
13 
case: If in 1967, DoD planners requested appropriation 
For example, in FY-1975, the FY-74 supplemental re¬ 
quest submitted by DoD included, among other items, a $480 
million increase for fuel price increases and a $3.4 Billion 
dollar increase for increases in pay resulting from legisla¬ 
tion. See [71, pp. 16-20] . 
12 
In the US Budget for FY-75, supplementals are de¬ 
scribed as representing "...the amounts required for various 
pay increases... and the additional amounts requested to meet 
unforeseen program costs, [60, FY75, p. 283], 
■^The 1967 CPI was only 5 points above the 1957 level. 
budgets based on a 10% inflation which they thought might 
occur when systems were delivered in 1974, Congress would 
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undoubtedly have denied the request. Similarly, if today 
DoD proposed budgets based on what some planners expect to 
be 17-18% inflation in 1978, Congress (acting on society's 
behalf) should scale down the request. In essence, the de¬ 
centralized agency is relieved of the responsibility for 
planning for unexpected inflation. Society (correctly) re¬ 
serves that responsibility by determining the inflation 
rate to be used by DoD planners. That is why in Chapter IV 
both capital and labor prices are adjusted to abstract un¬ 
planned inflation. The aim is to evaluate DoD planning 
within the constraints imposed, and one of the constraints 
is that DoD is not accountable for unexpected inflation in 
the budget process. 
11.4,3 Further orientation: defense operates as an 
open system within society. Society's constraints are the 
reason why opportunity costs to society and to DoD planners 
may be related only very indirectly. Properly functioning, 
DoD responds to the constraints, and society has the task 
of ensuring the constraints are consistent with society's 
goals. 
14,15 
The fact that the DoD influences society's views 
through lobbying-type efforts is ignored. Martin Bailey's 
claim that the defense establishment resembles a Robinson 
Crusoe economy is accepted [2, p. 339], 
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Operating within these constraints DoD presumably pro¬ 
cures defense systems consisting of hardware (capital) and 
manpower (labor) . Equipment is purchased from outside the 
DoD, and manpower is hired to operate the equipment. Equip¬ 
ment once obtained is supported and maintained internally. 
Consequently labor involved in operating, maintaining and 
supporting the systems can all be considered collectively 
as the defense labor requirement. Combined with the total 
weapon equipment stock, it determines the capital intensity 
of systems accumulated. The recent concern with the dichot¬ 
omy between operating and support personnel (in military 
jargon, the "Teeth-to-Tail" ratio) is not felt to be an im¬ 
portant distinction unless it can be shown that one of these 
personnel components is underutilized. Observations that 
the support category is growing relatively does not lead to 
interesting conclusions unless it can be shown that the sys¬ 
tems accumulated do not justify such a shift. Martin Bin- 
kin's concern that support costs are a large rising propor¬ 
tion of Defense expenditures [4] therefore has no direct im¬ 
pact on the present research, for it may be that such shifts 
have been efficient. 
T5 
Society's allocation problem is covered in great de¬ 
tail and controversy in the large body of literature on so¬ 
cial investment. Representative yet different viewpoints 
regarding the proper social cost of capital for federal ex¬ 
penditures are Arrow [1], Harberger [21], and Kaveman [23, 
App. B]. 
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The sole output of defense is "National Security," 
which defies measurement and is therefore assumed non-mea- 
surable. Nonetheless there is some implicit production 
function in operation which combines equipment and manpower 
to produce security. Consequently the concept of marginal 
utility has meaning, though a specific production function 
16 
will not be required. 
Partly as a result of the decentralization assumption, 
the economic process of defense expenditure is an "open" 
system. The cost of capital funds to DoD, for example, is 
17 
not an endogenous variable, and neither is the cost of 
labor. DoD is assumed to compete for labor on the open mar¬ 
ket. Combined, these effects make Dod a price-taker in both 
capital and labor. 
Furthermore, "National Security," the sole output of 
Defense, is not a product that is re-investable. DoD does 
not produce systems that can be used to produce other sys¬ 
tems. That is not completely accurate, as Naval shipyards, 
for example, are capable of producing ships. Yet, as pointed 
out by Wiedenbaum [57, pp. 49,50], the preponderance of De¬ 
fense systems are produced by private industry. Virtually 
1C 
Contrasting approaches are offered by Niskanen [39], 
who offers specific models of bureaucratic output under var¬ 
ious types of constraints. 
17 
In fact, under pure capital rationing, which is some¬ 
what resembled by the fixed DoD budgets, the cost of capital 
(in the accounting sense) is zero up to the budget level, 
and infinite thereafter. 
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all aircraft, missiles, and electronics are purchased, and 
Navy shipyards are now largely used for repairing and main¬ 
taining, rather than building Navy ships. This lack of re¬ 
investment opportunity means that the model does not require 
a feedback mechanism. Such feedbacks are at the heart of 
dynamic analysis such as economic growth theory. The open 
system here assumed for Defense allows a time dependent, 
yet static analysis of the relationship observed between 
3 8 
capital, labor, and their respective prices. This con¬ 
siderably simplifies the analysis. 
II.4.4 Stability is not essential in an open system. 
Since the research will be concerned with an open system 
over a limited time span (about 20 years), stability con¬ 
siderations are not vital. Trends showing a capital/labor 
ratio which rises without signs of abatement are acceptable 
within the model. Only in the economy as a whole, wherein 
prices are endogenous (and the system is essentially closed) 
should stability be a realistic concern—and even then peri¬ 
ods much longer than 20 years need to be considered. This 
again indicates the essentially micro-economic aspect of the 
approach. Macro-economic models cannot dispense so easily 
with stability. 
18 
Time variant systems are not necessarily dynamic in 
the full (feedback) sense of the term. The system to be 
considered best fits the "static and historical" classifi¬ 
cation of Samuelson [45, p. 60], 
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II.5 The Measurement of Capital 
There are two basic ways to measure capital. The way 
most favored by economists is the "value" measure, which 
values capital at the discounted present galue of its future 
19 
earnings. Accountants, on the other hand, are required to 
utilize the "volume" measure of capital, wherein capital is 
measured as the sum total of acquisitions adjusted for de¬ 
preciation. If this amount is adjusted also for changes in 
price levels, then the volume of capital can be measured as 
the replacement cost of the existing physical stock of (de¬ 
preciated) capital goods. This volume measure provides a 
proxy for the "real" measure of capital. 
II.5,1 Forward versus backward looking capital, prob¬ 
lems with each, and a choice. Sir John Hicks, with charac¬ 
teristic insight, refers to the value measure of capital as 
"forward-looking" capital, and the volume measure as "back¬ 
ward-looking" capital [27, p. 157]. In the present research, 
the backward-looking measure is used. This is not by choice 
so much as by default. The forward-looking measure requires 
knowing the future outputs, yet there i_s no measurable out¬ 
put. The value measure abandons us. 
The only other thing worth mentioning on the forward- 
looking matter is incidental and regards the choice of input 
This measure is attributable to Irving Fisher [15], 
and perhaps best illucidated by Hirshleifer [28, Chap. 2]. 
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prices. With no output measure and specifically (therefore) 
v/ith no objective function, the concept of "opportunity 
cost" loses meaning. Consider the earlier comments on DoD 
as a decentralized organization. It is quite valid to speak 
of the opportunity cost of a recruit to society, for society 
has quantitative output measures to maximize (GNP, for ex¬ 
ample) . But the opportunity cost of a recruit to DoD is un- 
20 
obtainable since output is not measurable. 
While it is true that there is some implicit production 
function with "National Security" as an output, implicit 
(that is, unknown) opportunity costs as prices are of no use. 
The input factor prices used, then, must be associated v/ith 
the backward-looking capital measure, which is available. 
The prices selected in the research are the Commerce Depart¬ 
ment's price indices for capital goods. These are consistent 
21 
with the capital measure for the purposes required.^ 
There are of course difficulties in using the backward¬ 
looking measure of capital too. Most of these can be ac¬ 
counted for given the proper information. One, however, is 
20 
Opportunity costs are descriptively defined as the 
marginal change in output per unit change in input. With 
output unmeasurable, opportunity costs are not available. 
21 
While price indices are not directly related to the 
cost of any specific equipment, they do reflect the relative 
cost of capital when compared with similar price indices for 
labor. These relative price ratios provide the comparison 
with the realtive levels of hardware and manpower (capital 
and labor) analyzed in Chapter III. 
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quite serious. It is the index number problem which arises 
when goods obtained in different years are "updated” through 
the use of price indices to obtain constant dollar valua¬ 
tions for capital in some base year. Informally stated, it 
is not valid to compare goods A, B, and C with goods B, C, 
and D through price indices which had to be based on the com¬ 
parison of the goods in the first place. In the case of cap¬ 
ital goods, even though their physical characteristics remain 
unchanged their productive capacity may not; so even if the 
same physical goods are compared, the comparison may be in- 
22 
valid. - In the present research we could assume that iden¬ 
tically physical goods have the same implicit output, and 
proceed as though the comparison is valid. In fact, we can 
be less restrictive and only assume technical progress is 
Hicks neutral. The subsequent model of fixed proportions 
ex post and substitution ex ante is consistent with this 
assumption and in fact necessary if any validity is to be 
22More formally, when comparing capital goods in one 
period with those of another, both the Laspeyre (L=Ipgq^/ 
Ipnq ) and the Paasche (P=Ip1q1/Ip1qf) indices may beu 
lost? The value index (V=Zp qjj'/Ep q^) is of no help without 
one of the others; P=V/L. Kick *saiscusses these capital 
measurement problems in his Part III of Capital and Time 
[21], see especially pages 153-54. He points out, though, 
on page 154, that'those theorists who prefer the value theo¬ 
ry have a similar problem, in that final goods (consumables) 
have value only in their utility, and utility is related to 
output much as output is related to physical capital. The 
index number problem therefore remains even in the forward- 
looking method of capital valuation. 
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attached to evaluating (backward-looking) capital in con- 
23 
stant dollars. Technical progress, its bias, and fixed 
versus substitutable proportions will be covered further 
below. 
The above comments and the related footnotes indicate 
the importance of orienting models of capital accumulation 
within the framework of consistent assumptions. The com¬ 
ments are believed important not only to ensure consistency 
in the present research, but for understanding and evalu¬ 
ating other models of defense resource allocation. The 
data available dictates that the present effort utilize 
backward-looking capital as the measure of capital stock, 
and that capital cost be directly related to price indices 
for capital goods. The assumptions required seem less 
heroic than if the alternate forward-looking technique were 
used. 
The value theory suffers from another problem asso¬ 
ciated with' footnote 9 above. In order to utilize dis¬ 
counted present value, an interest rate must be known. Yet 
the interest rate is a price and must therefore be an oppor¬ 
tunity cost dependent on the objective function being dis¬ 
counted. This circularity is at the heart of the classic 
controversies in capital theory. Napoleoni [37] surveys the 
problem in his first chapter, pointing out the importance 
of Sraffa's work in reconciling the problem under special 
assumptions [53].~ An analogous problem exists in the micro- 
economic case of capital rationing treated by Weingartner 
[56]. See Baumol and Quandt for specific criticisms of 
Weingartner1s use of a predetermined cost of capital [3], 
and Burton and Damon [7] for recent word on that contro¬ 
versy. 
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II.6 Fixed Factors and Substitutability 
Weapon system procurement is such that hardware and 
manpower factors are substitutable when a system is planned, 
but essentially fixed once procured. While some modifica¬ 
tions to systems can be accomplished after procurement (e.g. 
a computer can replace an operator), in the large such modi¬ 
fications are relatively minor—a cargo ship cannot be made 
into an aircraft. Such “ex-ante substitutability/ex post 
fixivity" in factors was introduced in Johansen's model [313. 
Phelps uses the descriptive and less tongue-twisting term 
"putty-clay" [41], which will for convenience be used here. 
Solow's article is more specific on the capital accumulation 
issues under consideration, and the model in Chapter III is 
a transmutation of his model in [52]. 
II.6.1 Putty/Clay modeling. Of interest for present 
purposes are not the results of Solow's model, but his model 
set-up, especially his treatment of capital stock, which 
comes in the form of "machines". Solow defines a machine 
to be the amount of capital required to produce one unit of 
output per year. Once produced each machine can only oper¬ 
ate with a crew of fixed size (the hard "clay" part). New 
machines, however, have substitutable factor proportions 
("putty") which depend on the relative factor prices and 
their marginal products. In the present model, since out¬ 
put is not measurable, a machine is instead defined to be 
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a unit of capital input measured in constant (1967) dollars. 
As in Solow's model, each old machine requires a crew of 
fixed size, and new machines have substitutable factors. 
The point of this subsection was to state that the 
putty-clay type model exists and that weapon procurement 
fits it reasonably well. That has been done, but by going 
a bit further some insights can be gained which may assist 
defense planners. 
II.6.2 Putty clay and forward/backward looking capi¬ 
tal... a synthesis to aid orientation. Risking some repeti¬ 
tion, a review of some of the earlier remarks on forward- 
and backward looking capital, combined with the "putty-clay" 
model, can put some of the theoretical problems and the se- 
« 
lected solution into perspective. Usually, to tie capital, 
labor, and output together, one defines aggregate capital 
in terms of the discounted output it produces (the forward- 
looking "value" theory of capital). Capital then has a 
unit price closely associated with the real interest rate 
24 
on funds. Labor cost is also normally measured in output 
units. The proper capital/labor ratio is then obtained by 
comparing marginal product ratios with marginal cost ratios. 
^ Capital in its "value" form is really liquid capital 
as opposed to physical capital stock. This difference is 
closely related to the "stocks and flows" definitions of 
capital equilibrium. See Hicks [26, Chapter VIII], for dis¬ 
cussion along this line. 
30 
When output is not measurable capital cannot be valued 
in output units. Thus it cannot be priced directly as a 
function of the interest rate. "National Security" cannot 
be converted into terns of capital goods since it cannot 
be sold or used in production. The proposed alternative was 
to shift to Hicks' backward-looking capital. Labor input is 
measured in man-years, and costed in the same dollar units 
as capital. But now, even with capital and labor inputs 
known and their relative prices given, there is no tie with 
output. The marginal factor products are not available if 
output is not measurable, and factor prices are therefore 
not relatable to output units. There is no way to apply the 
standard first order conditions of optimization and the usu¬ 
al economic approach seems to break down. 
Mathematically, if w and r are the costs of labor L and 
capital K, then the first order conditions are (see [24, p. 
64]) . 
3Q 
DL _ w 
~5q~ r ' 
SK 
where Q = Q(K,L) is output. If Q, w, and r are all measured 
in compatible units, and if c)Q/3L and rdQ/dK are obtainable, 
then no theoretical difficulties exist. However in the de¬ 
fense context, not only are the two partial derivatives un¬ 
available, but Q comes in the vague form of "National Secur¬ 
ity," the units of which are not comparable to the units of 
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w and r. 
But the situation is not economically hopeless, al¬ 
though some sacrifice is inevitable as will be seen. The 
key to salvaging the situation is to abandon the concern 
with the efficiency of a particular capital/labor allocation 
i 
and to stress the consistency of the allocation process over 
time. This is done by comparing changes in capital/labor 
ratios at different times...or more concretely, by comparing 
them to some benchmark value such as the ratio which existed 
at an arbitrary time zero. Then economic behavior which re¬ 
flects reaction to changing conditions—such as factor 
prices—can be evaluated as correct if the reaction is con¬ 
sistent, and questioned it if is not. Such before-after 
comparisons are common as has already been pointed out. 
What is less common is the realization by analysts that by 
making such comparisons, they have really assumed two 
things: (1) the base value (initial conditions), for the 
comparison is efficient; and (2) conditions have not cheinged 
severely during the comparison period. The latter assumption 
is usually well understood. The former is not. "Consistent" 
behavior may be very suboptimal if the arbitrary benchmark 
selected is one wherein the system is far out of equilibrium. 
Suppose a point is selected where the capital/labor ratio 
for DoD is not in "steady state" (borrowing that term for 
expository reasons). This might be the case after a major 
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policy change in factor pricing, e.g. the recent shift to 
an all volunteer force. Subsequent evaluations of the move¬ 
ment in the capital/labor ratio will be invalid if steady 
state was assumed for the benchmark. This does not present 
a modeling problem, for the system can be modeled without 
knowing the initial conditions. Eut an incorrect evaluation 
results if a correct model is applied with incorrect initial 
conditions. The practical safeguard is to select the time 
zero benchmark to coincide with a timeframe such that steady 
state is likely. 
Returning to the main point, it seems, under the putty- 
clay model, that new acquisitions are based very much on the 
concepts of marginal utility. Obviously new weapons somehow 
are selected with knowledge or at least expectations of 
factor prices. That sounds very much like a "value" approach 
to accumulation of systems. Yet earlier it was claimed that 
the model was based on the volume theory, or backward-looking 
concept of capital. The solution of this apparent inconsis¬ 
tency is explainable—and the explanation may contribute to 
understanding. The clue lies (as so many clues do) in Hicks' 
1973 analysis, though he is discussing a different point at 
the time. In discussing how to obtain an initial (time zero) 
measure for capital in the volume sense he suggests an arbi¬ 
trary time (similar to our "zero benchmark" above) where the 
value and volume measures can be assumed equal. He states 
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[27, p. 159]: 
"...it is perfectly consistent to use the 
value of capital at the base date as the 
initial volume,..." (underlined word 
italicised in original). 
This can be applied to the putty-clay case as follows. For 
new acquisitions the "base date" is in fact the time the 
purchase is made. So while new purchases are based on value 
arguments, they are simultaneously volume measures. Planners 
spend $X on a new system because its value is $X, and $X is 
the volume of the new acquisition since it costs $X. New 
purchases continue to be volume measures subsequently but 
cease being value measures since they can not be exchanged 
for newer equipment reflecting new factor prices (there are 
few markets for used weapons). Thus it is consistent in the 
putty-clay model to refer to all capital as being capital 
volume, or backward-looking. The putty-clay model seems to 
serve the ancillary purposes of synthesizing the volume and 
value views of capital. More directly, we can use a model 
which allows purchasing new defense systems based on margin¬ 
al utility considerations, yet still measure capital in a 
backward-looking sense. Finally, this allows using price 
indices for the price of capital, since price indices are 
also based on backward-looking valuation. 
II.7 Technical Progress and Substitution Elasticity 
In Chapter III the change in the factor input ratio 
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over time is attributed to changes in factor price ratios. 
One could argue, however, that capital/labor ratios change 
due to the form of technical progress which occurs, and it 
just happens that prices are changing simultaneously. 
This argument gains substance when it is recalled that De¬ 
fense systems are not selected from available "off-the- 
shelf" substitutes, but rather are developed to meet system 
requirements, and such development must take place within 
the technology available. This section will argue that for 
the open (microeconomic) system being considered, it does 
not matter, empirically, whether the changes are attributed 
to substitution or to bias in technical progress. 
II.7.1 Some forms of technical progress and its bias. 
A brief review of the forms of technical progress is appro¬ 
priate. Technical progress can be factor neutral or factor 
biased, embodied or disembodied, and induced or non-induced. 
There are many other classifications, but these will be the 
25 
the ones of the main concern. 
Progress is "Hicks’ neutral" over time if, when the 
factor input ratio is constant, the ratio of factor marginal 
25 
See Hahn and Matthews [20] for a general view of 
technical progress in the growth theory literature. 
Takayama [55] has a recent and somewhat more axiomatic 
approach for classifying progress. 
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productivities remains constant. This has the obvious 
corollary that if factor prices remain constant./ and deci¬ 
sions are based on equating marginal cost ratios with mar¬ 
ginal product ratios (the neo-classical dictum) then there 
would be no reason for factor input ratios to change. Any 
change in capital/labor (K/L) ratios that did occur would 
be attributable to changes in factor price ratios. That is 
the basis on which the model in Chapter III and the empiri¬ 
cal study in Chapter IV are founded. 
However the possibility of bias in technical progress 
should not be simply assumed away without justification. 
Labor-saving bias (which is the relevant possibility for 
tile results achieved in Chapter IV) exists in the Hicks 
sense if, when K/L remains fixed over time, the marginal 
product of capital increases. The corollary is that if 
technical progress is labor-saving and the price ratio re¬ 
mains constant, then K/L should increase over time. 
Suppose now that, as will be the case in the data found 
in this study, that the labor/capital price ratio (w/r) 
2 g 
If K and L are capital and labor inputs and if out¬ 
put Y*—F (KrL,t) , with t a time index, then Hicks' neutrality 
requires Y=A(t)F(K,L). Harrod neutrality has Y=F(K,A(t)L), 
or pure "labor augmentation." Harrod neutrality (and its 
mirror image Solow neutrality, Y=F(A(t)K,L)) are more suit¬ 
able to macroeconomic growth models, especially those con¬ 
cerned with steady-state conditions. For the present case, 
Hicks' direct use of marginality concepts is more compati¬ 
ble. 
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increases over time and the capital/labor ratio (K/L) also 
increases. Is the rise in K/L due to the rise in w/r (sub¬ 
stitution) or due to labor-saving technical progress? The 
point will be that while that question is of theoretical 
interest, there can be no resolution of it empirically given 
the constant rise in w/r which occurs in the data. This 
will be discussed further in Chapter IV, but the difficulty 
is obvious: a constantly rising w/r may cause a rising 
K/L through substitution elasticity, but it is possible the 
K/L rise would have occurred through technical changes even 
if prices had not changed. We can as well, and herein do, 
arbitrarily choose to ascribe the change to substitution 
elasticity. The empirical impossibility of differentiating 
substitution from bias in progress is further discussed be¬ 
low. 
II.7.2 Induced technical progress versus factor sub¬ 
stitution—an empirical difficulty. Actually, for the micro- 
economic model at hand, speaking in terms of technical pro¬ 
gress is too general. More properly the confounding which 
occurs is between substitution elasticity and induced tech- 
27 
nical progress. In the latter, entrepreneurs who foresee 
27 
Induced progress was originally introduced by, once 
again. Sir John Hicks [25, pp. 121-137]. It has been de¬ 
veloped further by Kennedy [32], and in the ensuing Samuel- 
son/Kennedy discussion, i.e., Samuelson [46], [47], Kennedy 
[33]. See also Sato [48], and Fellner [13], 
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labor costs rising relative to capital costs tend to delib¬ 
erately develop systems which are capital intensive. The 
distinction between technical progress and substitution in 
that case seems to boil down to the following: If, when 
prices change, other goods are available to replace current 
factors, then substitution is at work; if other goods must 
first be developed so they can replace current ones, then 
induced progress is at work. The difference between sub¬ 
stitution and biased progress (at least when viewed in the 
light of a microeconomic problem) obviously begins to blur. 
The empirical difficulties of isolating substitution 
and bias are highlighted by the nicely descriptive title of 
the paper by Diamond & McFadden, "Identification of the 
Elasticity of Substitution and the Bias of Technical Change: 
An Impossibility Theorem" [12]. The identification is not 
really impossible except under certain conditions, but 
these conditions happen to accompany the data available in 
the present research. 
II.7.3 Substitution elasticity, and putty/clay again. 
Having chosen to ascribe changes in factor input ratios to 
changes in factor price ratios, we will find in Chapter IV 
-28- 
Sato discusses the fact that the identification is not 
quite so impossible in [48]. What is required is, as in most 
statistical problems, enough variance over time to isolate 
the two effects. In the present study, the cost of labor/ 
cost of capital trends are too consistent to allow such iso¬ 
lation. 
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that the preferred estimate for the substitution elasticity 
turns out to be quite high'—considerably greater than 1. 
There are at least two explanations for this. The first is 
theoretical, and is based on Fellner’s first proposition re¬ 
garding induced innovations [13, p. 306], Fellner argues 
that, depending on the length of time between investment de¬ 
cisions and on the expected rate of rise in labor/capital 
prices, entrepreneurs will choose new investments with high¬ 
er K/L ratios than seem optimal based on current prices. 
This follows from the imperfection of not being able to ex¬ 
change goods freely at every point in time. In view of the 
long time periods between investment decisions on weapon 
systems, an apparently high substitution elasticity derived 
from Defense expenditure data seems proper. 
The second reason for a high substitution elasticity 
returns the discussion to the putty-clay model and to em¬ 
bodied change. Changes in overall capital/labor ratios can 
only arise due to new acquisitions since old investments 
have fixed factor inputs and progress is Hicks neutral. If 
the overall K/L ratio rises to a fraction x between two 
time points it means that the capital/labor ratio "embodied1' 
29 
in new equipments must be greater than x. " If substitution 
29 
This also assumes that some old equipment remains, 
and that equipment retired between the time points was repre 
sentative, in K/L terms, of the aggregate equipment in stock 
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elasticity is evaluated based on new acquisitions relative 
to price ratios, it must therefore be higher than if evalu¬ 
ated on the total equipment stocks. This will be explored 
within the context of the data in Chapter IV. 
With the discussion of some of the underlying theoreti¬ 
cal argument completed, we can turn to the mathematical de¬ 
tails of the model. 
CHAPTER III 
MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
Exploring the usefulness of capital/labor ratios as 
monitors of economic consistency in Defense will require 
developing two basic models. The first concerns the effect, 
on any particular ratio, of bias caused by errors made in 
the pricing of input factors. This will be referred to as 
"cost bias" and should not be confused with references to 
bias in technical progress. Cost bias exists if, after 
price inflation in the factor inputs has been abstracted, 
one factor is undercosted proportionately more than another. 
The second model involves the changes in capital/labor 
ratios which are attributable to changes in factor price 
ratios over time. This will be called the "substitution 
model." The cost bias model is a time-invariant, static 
look at capital/labor choices. The substitution model 
allows evaluating multiperiod trends in capital/labor ratios. 
Since "capital" and "labor" have such well-engrained 
connotations in macroeconomic growth theory, these terms 
will no longer be used for the present essentially micro- 
economic approach. Instead, the more appropriate terms 
"hardware" and "manpower" will be used. The term "capital/ 
labor ratio" will be replaced by "hardware/manpovrer" ratio. 
The term hardware, in particular, should avoid the tendency 
to think of the capital component in value, or forward- 
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looking terms. It stresses instead the volume measure of 
capital as defense hardware...one of the two factors com¬ 
bining to yield national security. 
The models naturally are developed with a decision 
maker in mind. A word on the decision maker is appropriate. 
Since the discussion is limited to economic variables such 
as prices and input ratios, then non-economic considera¬ 
tions, such as political, psychological, or social factors, 
are abstracted. This is equivalent tc assuming decision 
makers act solely on the economic facts at their disposal. 
These "naive decision makers" do not make mental adjustments 
to the data they perceive. For example, they would not men¬ 
tally adjust cost data upward simply because they feel past 
studies have underestimated costs. This is not completely 
realistic, however internalizing the psychological aspects 
which affect real world decisions is beyond the scope of 
this study. 
III.l The Cost Eias Kodel 
III.1.1 Cost bias defined. Assume that equipment is 
accumulated through annual purchase decisions made by plan¬ 
ners. The planners use unit input prices w and r^ for the 
two system inputs, manpower and hardware. The prices and 
r^ do not represent input prices in effect when a decision 
to buy is made. Rather they represent, at the time of the 
buy decision, planners' estimates of what input prices will 
42 
be when the system is delivered. 
30 
If the actual prices of 
these inputs at delivery time are ultimately and r , then 
cost bias as used herein is specified by the parameter b, 
defined 
(w /w ) p u 
( r /r ) 
P u 
(1) 
This represents the proportional undercosting of manpower 
relative to hardware by planners. The difference between 
prices subscripted by p and those subscripted by u occur 
because of costing errors resulting from either ignoring 
system costs which should be included, or from estimation 
errors which are unavoidable due to the long lead times be¬ 
tween the decision to buy and the delivery date of a system, 
Rearranging equation (1), 
(w /r ) 
u u 
For notational conveniences, denote this as 
(w/r) 
b = -y --P- 
(w/r)u 
(2) 
III.1.2 Cost bias and marginalitv considerations. 
Now consider the well known two-factor graphics of budget 
constraints and isoquants shown in Figures 1 and 2. Let 
30 
For example, in 1970 planners may estimate labor 
prices to be w in 1975, but when 1975 arrives, labor actu¬ 
ally costs w .P 
u 
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h 
Figure 1. Two-factor budget 
m 
constraints 
Qs 
m 
Figure 2. Two-factor isoquants and optima 
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h and m represent the hardware and manpower amounts asso- 
P P 
dated with the purchase decisions of a single arbitrary- 
period when prices p are in effect, h^ and m are defined 
similarly. Since -(w/r)^ is the slope of the budget con¬ 
straint (Figure 1) associated with the hardware and manpower 
inputs h and m priced at p, and similarly for -(w/r) , then 
the cost bias parameter b is a measure of the relative 
slopes of the planning price constraint and the ultimate 
price constraint. If (w/r) is steeper than (w/r) as shown 
P ^ 
then b>l. Otherwise b<l. If b=l, then no cost bias exists. 
B is the fixed budget. For Defense, B is analogous to 
the annual budget approved by Congress. The intercept 
points result if the total budget B is spent on only the 
one input: thus B/r^ is the amount of hardware which B 
will buy at the planning price r , when all of B is spent 
P 
on hardware. 
If planning prices p are used by planners, then in 
Figure 2 systems will be selected with hardware/manpower 
ratio (hp/mp) , for it is assumed the planners select systems 
such that the rate of technical substitution, (RTS)—repre¬ 
sented by the slope of the isoquants —equals the planned 
factor price ratio (w/r) Specifically, RTS = (w/r) ; 
P 
where RTSp is the slope at P of the highest achievable iso¬ 
quant . Summarizing, point P is the selection, at plan¬ 
ning prices, of systems which seem optimal. This optimum 
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calls for Q units of output. These are produced by sys- 
w 
terns with manpower inputs and hardware input hp. 
In equating RTS to w/r, planners exercise the ex ante 
substitutability of factors which accompanies new invest¬ 
ments. However once the new procurement contracts are let, 
these systems are assumed to have fixed factor proportions. 
This means that with a fixed budget, and with actual ulti¬ 
mate prices wu and r^, the only way to meet the budget B is 
to reduce output, or equivalently, reduce the number of sys¬ 
tems obtained. Since isoquants represent output units, the 
budget constraint can only be met by producing units in- 
31 
stead of Q^, that is by attaining point R.' This cutback 
in production means a cutback in systems from planning lev¬ 
els P to ultimate levels at R. Such cutbacks are not un¬ 
common in weapon procurement, as can be seen from Table 3, 
columns (2) and (5). 
If the production function yielding the Q_. 's is homo¬ 
geneous, as is assumed here, then at R the slope of iso- 
32 
quant equals the slope of at P. Therefore 
— 
For the present it is assumed that system cutbacks 
required in meeting the constraint at R instead of P are 
made without having an excess in one factor. That is the 
cutbacks occur along OP. This is the most efficient cut¬ 
back possible given the ex-post fixed factor assumption. 
32 
The homogeneity assumption prevents theoretical 
difficulties, but is not critical conceptually. 
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RTS„ = RTS = (w/r) = b(w/r) , (3) 
X\ ir p U. 
the last equality coining from (2) . 
111.1.3 Cost bias, marginality, and substitution 
elasticity. Point U in Figure 2 represents the solution 
which would have evolved had planners used the prices 
and r^. U would yield the hardware/manpower ratio (hy/ir^) , 
here denoted (h/m) . The ratio of (h/m) relative to (h/m) 
u U R 
is needed. Obviously this ratio will depend on the substi¬ 
tutability between hardware and manpower inherent in the 
production function. Hicks* elasticity of substitution 
measures such substitutability. Let X denote this elastic¬ 
ity. Then X is defined [24, p. 62] 
\ - d (h/m) / (h/m) 
d(RTS)/(RTS) 
111.1.4 The basic cost bias relationship, 
this expression leads to^ 
(h/m) = A(RTS)^ . 
(4) 
Solving 
(5) 
Since A is constant, the following results 
(h/m)R 
(h/m)u 
(RTSr) 
(RTSy) 
(6) 
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Use di/i=d(ln i), multiply by the denominator in (4), 
integrate, and purge of logarithms. A is a constant of in¬ 
tegration which will be invariant if X is constant, which is 
so assumed. CES production functions, for example, fit this 
case. See Henderson and Quandt [24] especially pages 85-86. 
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By inspection of Figure 2, RTS^ = (w/r)^. This, plus (3) 
leads directly to the relation between (h/m) , the hardware/ 
K 
manpower ratio resulting from the use of planning prices p, 
and (h/m)^, the ratio which should have evolved from actual 
prices w and r : 
u u 
(h/m)R _ . 
(h/m) 0 
(7) 
Equation (7) is the basic cost bias model and shows the 
effect of cost bias on hardware/manpower ratios, as well as 
the dependence on substitution elasticity. Equation (7) 
also shows one reason that the major empirical tasks of the 
3 4 
research are to estimate b and X." J With them, the utiliza¬ 
tion of hardware/manpower ratios as indicators of defense 
allocation effectiveness may be meaningful, not only for the 
one period static case above, but for the multiperiod con¬ 
siderations discussed in the next subsection. 
III.1.5 Some miscellaneous comments on cost bias. 
Note the implications of cost bias as specified in (7). If 
b=l, then the hardware/manpower ratio planned on planning 
prices p and the one which is efficient based on ultimate 
3 4 
substitution elasticity X as used above and the sub¬ 
stitution elasticity to be used in the next section are con¬ 
ceptually different. The former is the elasticity due to ex¬ 
isting alternatives at a point in time, the latter the elas¬ 
ticity due to alternatives becoming available over time. How¬ 
ever since no empirical estimate can be made of the former, 
it is assumed equal to the latter, which is estimated in 
Chapter IV. A 
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prices u will be equal. This means that if the prices on 
input factors are underestimated by the same proportion, 
the proper hardware/manpcwer ratio will accompany planned 
systems. This in turn means that the proper quantity of 
Figure 3. Zero cost bias optimization 
systems will be obtained: the fixed budget constraint will 
force less system units to be obtained than are planned, 
but this number will match what would have been planned had 
proper prices been used. This is less confusing in Figure 
3, which shows zero cost bias (i.e., b=l) as the budget 
constraints are parallel. Points R and U coincide, so 
(h/m)^ - (h/m)p. Even though the wrong prices (p) were used 
in planning, the same system configuration and quantity re¬ 
sults as if the correct prices (u) had been used. 
If cost bias is zero, then the implications of correct¬ 
ing the price estimation for only one factor and not the 
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other are obvious: cost bias will result where it was ab¬ 
sent before, and a less satisfactory result occurs than if 
no such correction occurred. This matter will be further 
discussed in Chapter V. 
III.2 The Substitution Model 
Substitution between hardware and manpower is of inter¬ 
est independent of cost bias. In fact the empirical find¬ 
ings will indicate cost bias is not significant. Conse¬ 
quently it is of more practical interest to study the shifts 
in hardware/manpower ratios over time. These shifts and 
their relation to factor price ratios lead to the substitu¬ 
tion model. 
III.2.1 Underlying considerations. Denote the accum¬ 
ulated hardware stock at time t as H^, and the gross new 
hardware goods added to the stock between t and t+1 (desig¬ 
nated period t) as h^. Also assume the goods in h^ are homo¬ 
geneous and their associated manpower requirements m^ are in- 
35 
dependent of existing systems. If the prices in effect 
3 6 
when selecting the goods h^ are w^ and r^, then (w/r)^ will 
35 
Note the new hardware can be selected dependent on ex¬ 
isting hardware, and still have the manpower requirements of 
the new hardware independent of the old hardware. Thus, a 
new missile system may be selected dependent on existing guns, 
aircraft, radars, etc., but the manpower intensity of the new 
system will probably not depend on the manpower intensities 
of the existing systems. 
O Cl 
Differences between planning and ultimate prices can 
be held separate from the present considerations since the 
effect of that difference can be recovered through using (7). 
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determine the economically correct hardware/manpower ratio 
37 
(h^/m^) inherent in the new goods h^. Denote this ratio 
3 8 
by (h/m)^. Then (h/m) is the "full performance" hard¬ 
ware/manpower ratio of the newly acquired, or period t sys¬ 
tems .. .meaning the ratio such that in the new systems (made 
up of hfc and m^) both factors are fully utilized. Let 
(H/M) be a similar full performance hardware/manpower ratio 
associated with H^. Finally let be the hardware retired 
from stock through either tactical or physical depreciation 
in period t and let its associated full performance hardware/ 
manpower ratio be c^_. Now the hardware stock at t+1 must 
equal the stock at t plus hardware added during period t 
minus hardware retired during t. That is. 
Ht+i - Ht + ht - kt • 
(S) 
Therefore if the manpower intensity associated with h^ and 
u 
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k^ were known, then the overall hardware/manpower ratio at 
37 
The notation could be simplified by denoting the man¬ 
power intensity of hardware by a single parameter, say h* 
instead of h/m. This is essentially what Solow does in his 
vintage approach [52]. The notation h/m (and later H/M) is 
retained to avoid remembering too many definitions in the 
reading. 
r> o 
The term is used by Hicks [27, p. 52]. It differs 
from "full-employment" in an essential way. Full employment 
has a macroeconomic connotation in which prices are endogen¬ 
ous. Here, prices are exogenous, analogous to Hicks "fix- 
price" model. The term full-performance is more appropriate 
to a microeconomic model. 
39 
"Manpower intensity" being measured by the full per¬ 
formance hardv/are/manpower ratio inherent in these hardware 
quantities. 
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time t+1, could be obtained by using a weighted average of 
the hardware intensities of the quantities on the right hand 
side of (8): 
(H/M) 
t+1 
Ht(H/M)t+ht(h/m)t-ktct 
R +il K 
t t t 
(9) 
This iterative relationship for II/M will yield an absolute 
value for (H/M) if come initial time zero value (H/M) is 
known. To predict what values (H/M) should take, this 
time zero value should be such that the system is in equi¬ 
librium, or "steady state" at that time. 
III.2.2 Hardware retirement. In practice, even if 
(H/M)g is known, (h/m) and c^ are not. Hardware is not 
homogeneous as was assumed, and it would be impossible to 
record the manpower requirements of each individual item 
entering and leaving the hardware stock. Even if (h/m)t 
could be estimated based on the one period conditions de¬ 
scribed in Figure 2, (which would require knowing the pro¬ 
duction function), there is no practical wav of estimating 
c^. As with most impasses, an assumption is needed. 
One obvious assumption is to conclude that the oldest 
hardware will be retired first, and c^ determined according 
* 
to the prices in effect when that hardware was originally 
delivered. Another is to assume the economic conclusion 
that hardware is selectively retired so as to bring the 
overall hardware/labor ratio into line with current prices. 
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This last assumption is unrealistically optimistic, but could 
prove useful in later research as a "most optimum" baseline 
case. Unfortunately the first assumption, according to DoD 
personnel, is also not realistic. Apparently a more random 
process characterizes the phasing out of old equipment. 
Systems with strong advocates remain in service, those with¬ 
out do not. Furthermore tactical obsolescence sometimes 
forces retirement independently of age. 
Under such circumstances it is not unreasonable to 
assume that systems being retired are randomly selected and 
therefore have a manpower intensity which is representative 
of the overall average of systems on hand. This makes c^ 
equal to (K/M) , a relationship inherent in the use of a net 
depreciation rate which acts uniformly over the hardware 
stock (the descriptive term for such depreciation is "evap- 
40 
orative decay," see Karl Shell [50, p. ]]).* A fine point, 
but one worth mentioning, is that depreciation does not act 
on systems acquired, in period t until time t+1. 
III.2.3 The basic substitution model. The relation¬ 
ship between (H/M) ^ and (H/M) is 
(H/M) 
t+1 
(H/M) t [Ht (1-6) +Rt) + (h/m) tht 
Hll—6)+Rt+ht 
(10) 
Of course, as hardware "evaporates" through exponen 
tial decay, the manpower used to man it becomes available 
for use in newer systems. 
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where R are repair funds for period t, and 6 is the (con¬ 
stant) annual rate of depreciation, including both physical 
and tactical decay. Expression (10) assumes repair funds 
are used to maintain hardware remaining in the stock at 
time t...i.e., R acts to offset depreciation in hardware. 
While normally R is less than depreciation Ht«<5, it is 
possible for R, to exceed This would imply that re- 
pair funds are actually being used to increase, rather than 
simply maintain, the hardware stock. This allows for the 
41 
repair funds to be used for procurement purposes. 
The derivation of (10) is intuitive. The denominator 
is total hardware stock held at time t+1, and the bracketed 
term in the numerator is hardware carried forward from t to 
t+1. Then (10) simply combines the old hardware/manpower 
ratio (H/M) with the new (h/m)^, each weighted by the rela¬ 
tive size of the systems they represent; (H/M) represent¬ 
ing the remaining old systems, and (h/m) the (gross) new 
systems.^ 
41 
A phenomenon probably realistic in the "real world" 
of Defense budgeting. O & M funds could be used, for exam¬ 
ple, to pay transportation costs actually associated with 
new procurement. But such flexibility is quite limited 
overall. 
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Various modifications to (10) could be considered. 
These include allowing <$ to vary with time, R. to be phased 
out over several periods, and letting h.u to be partly made 
up of hardware planned for delivery at some other time but 
arriving during t. Such complications would not add signif¬ 
icantly to the research, for their effects are secondary. 
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III.3 Cost Bias and Substitution: Model Synthesis 
Equation (6) was derived for the static one-period 
model on cost bias. An analogous relation can be derived 
between the hardware/manpower ratios associated with price 
ratios of two different time periods. At some arbitrary 
time zero let h/m be (h/m)^ and w/r be (w/r) q. Retaining 
the assumption of homogenity in the implicit production 
function, and further assuming the production function re¬ 
flects Hicks' neutrality, the following results 
(h/m)t = 
(w/r)t 
(w/r)Q 
(h/m) q . (11) 
If time 0 is selected to be a time when the initial 
conditions are known, then (h/m)q will be known or estimated 
44 
and (11) will lead to subsequent values of (h/m)^." ‘ These 
This results from the definition of A, the elasticity 
of substitution, exactly analogous to the derivation of (5) 
above: 
> = d (h/m) / (h/m) 
d (RTS)"/ (RTS) f 
and the neoclassical assumption that an optimum is chosen at 
RTS=w/r, lead to (h/m), = D(w/r)£ where D is a constant of 
integration which is invariant if'Hicks neutrality holds and 
A is constant. See footnote (33) above. Hicks neutrality 
ensures that A isconstant over time for a given h/m ratio. 
44 
Initial conditions can take various forms. For exam¬ 
ple if the w/r trend has been constant and (H/M)^ is known 
then (h/m)n may equal (H/M)n times some constant greater 
than unity. 
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values are what are needed to utilize equation (10) and 
find the (H/M) values over time which would be consistent 
with the assumptions and with economic efficiency. (H/M) 
derived in this way would be compared with actual H/M val¬ 
ues, that is with ratios of actual hardware to actual man¬ 
power, to see if the two matched. From a predictive point 
of view, policy changes which affected the w/r ratio (such 
as the 1971 switch to an all volunteer force, which raised 
(w/r)) could be analyzed to predict the effects on hardware 
versus manpower trends. 
This is all dependent on the assumption that technical 
45 
progress is (Hicks') neutral. If some knovm bias exists 
in progress, then (11) would have to be modified to include 
the bias factor. 
Even under neutral technical progress, the above re¬ 
quires knowing the parameter X, a quantity which has not 
been directly estimated for Defense resource utilization. 
It is for this reason that the research abstains from the 
predictive approach, and instead concentrates in Chapter IV 
on the empirical estimation of X. 
The effect of cost bias can be included with the effect 
of rising (w/r) ratios over time. The latter are specified 
in equation (11) above, which shows that given an (h/m)^ and 
the change in w/r between time 0 and t, one can find the ex- 
45 
This issue was discussed in section II.7.1 above. 
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pected h/m for time t. If cost bias exists, and if it is 
assumed constant through time, then both (h/m)t and (h/m)^ 
will be affected identically, that is through relationship 
(7) above. From (7), if (h/m) ^ should have been (h/m)^/b^ 
and (h/m) should have been (h/m) ^/bA, then no change in 
(11) would result. It would simply be the case that both 
(h/m)q and (h/m) were in error by the same proportion, 
leaving their relative change over time the same as indi¬ 
cated by (11) . 
Of course, if at time t cost bias is b, 
t 
it is b^/b^, then (11) would become 
(h/m) t/b£ 
(h/m) 0/bA 
t 
(w/r) 0 
and at time 0 
(12) 
or 
(h/m) t 
'(h/m) 0 
bt (w/r) t 
b' • (w/r) „• 
(13) 
The possibility of a change in cost bias is not in¬ 
vestigated here, and instead an estimate for a constant 
bias factor is derived.^ 
4 6 
There is at least circumstantial evidence that cost 
bias may have been constant. First, there has been no major 
changes in the compensation type pay system which would se¬ 
verely effect manpower undercosting. Second, on the hardware 
side, Ronald Fox implies there has been little change in sys¬ 
tem acquisition problems, at least since 1962. Chapter I of 
his recent book covers these matters. Ke refers to a well 
known Harvard study to make his point: "More than a decade 
57 
We now turn to that derivation as well as the deriva¬ 
tion for X. 
46 (Continued) 
after the publication of The Weapon Acquisition Process, 
the problems cited by Peck and Scherer are still with us." 
[16, p. 10]. The Peck and Scherer study referred to is 
[40]. Even earlier evidence indicating similar cost growth 
problems is contained in Marshall and Meckling [36]. The 
general impression one gets is that weapon procurement 
costs have been understated historically, and that the 
problem still exists without much change. 
CHAPTER IV 
EMPIRICS 
Two hypotheses are investigated through analysis of 
data on U.S. Navy resource allocations from 1955 to 1974. 
The hypotheses are the following: 
Hypothesis 1. Costing bias has favored the 
acquisition of labor intensive 
systems. 
Hypothesis 2. The elasticity of substitution 
between labor and capital is 
zero. 
IV.1 Investigation of Hypothesis 1 
IV.1.1 Manpower undercosting, empirical findings. 
The results relating to hypothesis 1 are based on weapon 
system cost studies conducted during the 1960’s. The man¬ 
power undercosting factor is estimated by comparing manpower 
costs used in those studies with current figures for total 
costs of manpower. All costs are normalized to 1974 dol¬ 
lars, using the wage indices shown in Table 9 (column (1)) 
of the appendix. 1974 estimates for total manpower costs 
are used because recent emphasis in the costing area has 
provided comprehensive figures not considered available 
when the studies were conducted. 
Table 1 shows the manpower costs by system. The "cost 
in current dollars" figures represent the planner's esti- 
59 
TABLE 1 — Manpower Costs Used in Selected System Cost 
Studies During 1960-70 Period (Costs in Dollars per Man-Year). 
Current $ Cost 
Plan- 
Cost in 1974 Dollars 
System 
Officer Enlist. 
ning 
Year Officer Enlisted 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
ULMS 7,130 4,379 1964 13,475 8,276 
B-58 12,535 6,060 1964 23,691 11,453 
Seahawk 15,500 4,657 1964 29,295 8,802 
PTF — 5,994 1964 — 11,329 
PGH - 6,192 1964 — 11,703 
LAAV 12,000 6,200 1966 20,760 10,726 
MFE 16,000 10,000 1967 25,560 16,600 
Average Cost Used 22,556 11,270 
Total Cost 35,320 15,500 
SOURCES: Officer and Enlisted costs are obtained 
from references [80], ]81], [83], [84], [85], and [87]. 
Costs in current dollars are those specified in cost 
studies, and reflect costs anticipated to be in effect 
when system is active. Total cost figures are based on 
[78, App. A and B] with 0-4 representing average officer 
total and a weighted average representing the enlisted 
figure. (The weighting by manpower levels in each en¬ 
listed grade places the mean grade 1/3 of the way from 
E-4 to E-5). 
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mates of what manpower would cost when the systems were 
activated (see footnote 30). The average values $22,556 
for officers and $11,270 for enlisted can be compared with 
the total cost figures $35,320 and $15,500 respectively. 
These last two figures are the total costs in 1974 terms 
of comparable officer and enlisted personnel. Officers 
were apparently costed at an estimated 22,556/35,320 or 0.64 
or total cost, and enlisted at 11,270/15,500 or 0.73 of 
47 
total cost. Since enlisted pay budgets are approximately 
4 times officer budgets, a weighted average for manpower un¬ 
dercosting is 0.71. In the notation of the previous chap¬ 
ter, w /w equals 0.71. 
A problem encountered in the data search yielding Table 
1 was that cost studies for systems procured in the 1960s 
were either not conducted, not available, or, as in most 
cases, did not explicitly mention personnel costs. The 
shortage of such studies influenced the decision to include 
one non-Navy system (B-58). The seven studies included in 
the analysis resulted from a search of more than 50 studies 
purporting to be cost studies conducted for the Defense De¬ 
partment during the time frame of interest. 
* 
A 
These figures are for "standard" personnel types, i.e., 
do not reflect the costs of pilots (aviators) submariners, or 
other specially trained personnel. The ratios obtained would 
be approximately the same if such personnel were included, as 
their effects would raise both numerator and denominator of 
the fractions almost proportionately. 
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IV.1.1.1 Manpower undercosting, some deducted 
confirmation of empirical findings. Some confirmation of 
the manpower undercosting factor obtained can be found in 
the formal costing instructions in effect at the time. 
These instructions usually specify that direct costs be used 
48 
in comparing systems. Discussions with personnel engaged 
in manpower costing indicate general agreement on the exclu¬ 
sion of such indirect costs as housing, medical, administra¬ 
tive, and retirement benefits from system costing since 
these are not paid from the "military personnel" budget cate¬ 
gory. An estimated cost of such items from a recent source 
shows they are about $11,100 for officers and $4,247 for en- 
49 
listed. This leads to an imputed undercosting factor of 
($35,320-$ll,100)/$35,320), or 0.69 for officers and simi¬ 
larly 0.73 for enlisted. The weighted average of these in¬ 
puts an undercosting factor of 0.72 to manpower costing. 
The similarity of this figure and the empirically derived 
48 
For example, [70, enclosure 2, p. 5] states personnel 
costs are charged according to "the cost of military person¬ 
nel services involved directly in the work, performed." The 
instruction is entitled "Economic Analysis and Program Eval¬ 
uation for Resource Management," and is a prime directive 
for guidance in Defense investment analysis. 
49 
Reference [72] provides annual composite cost figures 
for various grades. These do not include the factors for 
quarters, retirement, variable support, and other support 
(estimated at 20% elsewhere in the report). The data on page 
17 of [72] were used to obtain the above values, which are 
the ratios of the composite cost to the composite plus the 
above mentioned exclusions. 
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0.71 lends at least some support to the conclusion that this 
last figure is of the proper magnitude. 
IV.1.2 Hardware undercosting. The undercosting fac¬ 
tor for hardware, r /r , is obtained from data included in 
p u 
the quarterly "Selected Acquisition Reports," (SARs), re¬ 
quired on major weapon systems. Every system under the SAR 
process is reviewed quarterly to monitor cost changes. Sys¬ 
tems included in the present analysis are all Navy systems 
under procurement as of October 1974. Systems under develop¬ 
ment, but not yet under procurement, were excluded because 
the cost data associated with such systems are preliminary 
and therefore less accurate. Furthermore, initial cost es¬ 
timates are those specified in the SARs to be "development 
estimates." The earlier (and usually lower) "planning esti¬ 
mates" are not used since major funds are not obligated un¬ 
til the development phase begins. This commitment tends to 
50 
make the cost estimate more accurate. 
IV.1.2.1 Hardware undercosting as evidenced by 
SAR cost growth categories. The hardware undercosting fac¬ 
tor is derived by comparing each system’s unit cost as esti¬ 
mated at the development date with the unit cost as of the 
4 
50 
These opinions result from discussions with personnel 
at the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Program 
Analysis and Evaluation). They are explicitly stated in 
(76]. 
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October 1974 SAR. Each SAR specifies the components of 
cost change, the major categories being: economic (infla¬ 
tion) , quantity, engineering schedule, support, and esti¬ 
mating changes. 
The types of cost changes included in each category 
51 
are the following: 
Economic: Cost increases caused by contract changes 
resulting from revised economic forecasts. These 
are essentially inflation caused. 
Quantity: Cost changes caused by changes in the 
number of units of a weapon type being produced. 
Engineering: Cost changes caused by altering the 
physical characteristics of a system in procurement 
or development. 
Schedule:. Cost changes caused by adjustments in the 
delivery schedule or other milestones in the produc¬ 
tion schedule. 
Support: Cost changes caused by changes to support 
equipment or services indirectly linked to the major 
system considered. An example would be a change in 
the specified number of spare parts per unit. 
Estimating: Cost changes due to corrections or re¬ 
finements of previous estimates. 
These changes have obvious overlap areas, and costs be¬ 
longing to one category may be erroneously or even deliber¬ 
ately ascribed to another. A contractor could, for example, 
blame inflation for inefficiencies in scheduling, and per- 
4 
haps escape detection. However there are government safe¬ 
guards against such actions. Whatever, the SAR's do expli- 
pp. 
51 
These categories are discussed with examples in 
40-44], and in Fox [16, pp. 365-368], 
[62, 
64 
citly place cost growth into the various categories, and this 
study can only assume these placements are approximately 
52 
accurate. Further discussion on this matter is contained 
in section IV.1.2.4. 
Of these different cost growth categories, economic and 
engineering changes are abstracted from the cost growth 
figure obtained in this analysis. The first because infla- 
tion must be excluded from the hardware cost growth consider¬ 
ations as it was from the manpower side. The second because 
engineering changes presumably cause system improvements, and 
unit costs should be adjusted to compensate. All other cost 
categories are assumed to reflect improper cost estimation 
at program inception, and to therefore be properly included 
as factors in cost growth. Table 2 provides the various 
systems considered, the changes in estimated unit costs 
since program inception, and the program weights which 
reflect relative program size in dollars of budget commitment. 
Obviously any estimate of cost growth which is based on the 
individual cost growth facts of the separate programs must 
take the relative size of the program into account. Table 
2 is derived from Table 3 which contains the raw data direct¬ 
ly from the SARs. * 
A comparison of cost growth relative to time since pro- 
52 
For a discussion of contract changes, their causes 
and implementation, again see Fox [16, Chapter XIX]. 
T
A
B
L
E
 
2
 
—
 
C
o
s
t 
G
ro
w
th
 
D
a
ta
 
f
o
r
 
N
a
v
y
 
S
y
s
te
m
s
 
U
n
d
e
r 
S
A
R
 
P
r
o
c
e
s
s
 
65 
tn 
5 p 
£ o ^ 
O 4-> 
p o 
o ret 
Tm 
i 
0 
-p 
0 -ri —I 
U fi -Pi 
P H 
•H /-> 
W g CfO 
(U 
Ifl P -H 
P tn -P 
0 o 
0 P 
5H P-4 
w 
£ p 
fd >1 
P —' 
tn 
SS 
f*4 t7> 
p 
0 
h3 
CM 
0 
-P 4-1 ^ 
in 45 3 
>i Cn 
co *rp 
0 
& 
£ 
0 
-P 
in 
>i 
w 
o'! vo ^ vo co a-\ c\ mnohri oo o m 
H r- 00 O rH CT\ CN CO OO rH 00 O rH LO O o o o 
HHfOPH O i—1 i—1 r—1 t—i O rl rl rP rp rP rP CM 
rH 
ID VO ^ 0 ro in in in r^* CM rp rp CO in oo vo 
H I CM 00 CO n> co co c\ o 00 rH (Ti VO ON r- co i 
i—1 1 i—1 H rP rP rP rP rP 1 
M1 H H IJ3 h cm om r- in ^ CTl CM rP 00 CO VO rP 
rH rP rH 
4 
Ch 
rH 2 
CO CO X O CO 
& vo oo co H Q CO 
Cm O vo co 2 H VO 
Q 2m 2 0^ U Pi W < Eh 
r- SJ 53 < O CM rP raj oo S3 O CO 00 2 U) 
i h o > a PI 1 1 IP X 1 P-< M O 1 co .< 
< < U Q Q Q CP Cm PJ S P4 pk Pk Pi Pi CO 0) > 
0 1 
£ ,Q 1 
•rp 0 P 
-p +> •rp 
0) 0 
rP W *rp >1 
'— •rp -P 43 
p r-x ^ 4P rp 
p CO o 0 • 
p P a 
rP G •H +» 
o P £ cn 0 0 
o £ d rP rp 
P rp 0. 
c h o'd X -P 
•rp o u p 0 P 
u 0 p 0 
p £ 
•P • ,—, Qa 
0 • ^ on r4 r*-P 0 
fd c r- ■—' pp H 
0 cr» 5 0 
p •rp rp in 0 > 
0 4-> p P 0 
0 U £ tr>rp 
•d £ 0 P 
0 U Xi rP +J £ 
w C O o in 0 
0 4P -P u 0 P 
43 P o u tn 
•H O 4P 0 
* 0 ■p P 
0 0 0 •H 04 
N rH -P £ p 
•rp 43 p p 0 
W 0 0 w 0 
rP pj p p 
£ •rp 0 >1 0 •rp 
0 0 ^ 43 Pu in 
P > 
tn 0 -P oo cn in 
0 P P P 
P g 0 0 •H 0 
CU 0 g rp -P • H 
P £<43 0 4-> 
0 44 O fd o fd 
►> r—I EH -H 0 
•H rd 0 ^ -H 
■P 0) > In c w 
0 -P 0 o -H -H 
H (d rd fd 
0 £ ^ P o 
P -H £ io (U £ 
•P 0—' -h 
to in p h b 
■h 0 tr> p a, p 
O S *H *H 
0 P P -P P 
I—I *rp Pu r—( fH 0 
w O P 0 
— e o g p 
P CM 0 -H 
g P tn o t?» 
3 4P p 45 P 
rP p *H -P 0 
0 £Pd 
U 3 rJ-H ifl P 
r-p 0 > -H O 
O J>vH \ 
•• U r3 = 'd 
Ui *P tn P 
W w >i= fd 
EH • 0 45 
O oo p p 
2 0fd • o 
0 0 0 0 -H 
r-H £ 0 f—i pJ 
43 -p 43 fd 
fd o fd fd rH 
£k -P -P -p 4H 
66 
4-1 
O 
0 
d 
•P 
g 
0 
e 
0 
G 
G 
o 
o 
G 
Pi 
G 
0 
Tl 
G 
ID 
(A 
0 
0 
o 
o 
G 
P 
P 
CO 
G 
0) . 
'd ^ 
o 
0 *H 
£ H 
<D P 
P *H 
0 S 
>1 
co G 
•H 
£ 0 
d 0 
2! P 
G 
G tA 
0 •H 
4H Pm 
d P 
p d 
d P 
Q rH 
o 
P Q 
w ■—' 
o 
u 
1 CA 
1 P 
ro P 
0 
w XX 
p 0 
P p 
3 o 
Eh o 
■K 
4: 
P 0 in VO 00 VO 
CO •H O' CM CM VO cr* r- VO CA in 
0 G G CA o^ o o o rH r- cr> CM •K r- p CM o * •^l4 •K CA 
O'! D d 
G p o o o CO ca 00 CM O VO CM CA CA o CM o 
d u H4 rH LO rH O') 
X 
U 
rH 
1 o 
P G G o CO o CO O co CM CM CT\ 'd4 o CO O o o O CM •514 
0 •H •H CO 
O o> P CO VO o CM O CM O'* na rH cn m i—i 00 o VO O in H4 
u G 0 o ov o\ 1—1 l» 00 P CM CA O'* 
H 0 CM p p P 
ns 
0 
G 1 
•H d o o r- in O LO o CO o o O o o O o 
d rH G ,—, 
i—1 P o r- LO CM 00 VO CM VO o >51' VO CO O CO o P CA VO 
a G •H V-^ VO rH ro CO r- CM vi4 CO rH CM cr» ^ IT) VO CO O •5J'4 
X H p CO CM CO in CM rH rH rH CM CO CM rH ■H4 CO 
w p p 
00 VO 00 
4J p rH rH VO VO CO rH in CA >534 
•H 0 O rH t- o o C' CO 00 o * r- in CA * in •X O 
G 0 VO 
P O --- VJ4 O o CO o 00 00 VO CM LO VO o in 
in CM rH CM rH CO P O CO p 
d CO rH CO CM p 
-P 
d 
Q 0 VO 00 CO O LO VO m hc NT o O CM * r~ 4C (A 
-P /'•N »34 O CO CO CO CO rH in CO CO 00 CO 
P •H LO VO 00 in CO CM LO P 
G G *» 
0 D VO CM 
P 
P 
G 
U rH O o CM 00 CO CO in C" o r- CA in CO O P CA co CA 
d p /—S CO o i—i in o-\ CTi 00 o 00 in i—1 f o VO P 00 VO ><i4 
•P 0 in CO •H4 in in in c\ CO rH in cm rH P 00 CM CO "514 
0 0 V. *» V V. V* 
EH U CM CM CO rH VO 1
 
1
 
2
 
in 1
 
1
 
4
 
co 
rH 
CM CM LO 
-P P VO CO LO H> CO CM CO rH 
•H 0 X34 O rH o o ■M1 •M1 HO# •sj< CO CM CM •K in LO 
G 0 m 
d P U -- CM O o O'* VO CO CT\ CO CO CM H1 H* O ^j4 rH 
-p CO r- rH rH m i—1 VO CM p 
d VO CM rH 
Q 
P 0 in in oo CO o CO O <J\ G-x ■*c O O H4 ■»: CA 4c r-' 
G P CA cc h4 CO CO VO O in CO 00 OA o 
0 •H CM in r- CO 1-1 CO rH Ol 
g G — ** Vi 
a P o CO CM 
0 rH 
,—i 
0 
> 1—1 VO H4 rH VO rH o VO VO o H1 H4 H4 VO VO CA p 00 CM 
0 d P VO m H4 CO CO CM 00 VO CO in O'* ■M4 CM CO VO CA 'H4 rH 
Q P 0 1-1 •m4 -vr o in CO in rH CO r- CM CM t"' in in CO r" CO 
0 0 V *» •* »• *» w 
Eh u rH CM CM VO rH rH P CO •514 CM in 
ca 
1 rH 
d CO 00 X o oo 
g G G & VO CO CO H Q 00 
0 tA o P o VO OO 2 H 
< 
VO 
P •rH •H p Q oo s u •n4 >5r u W M Eh 
0 0 p r- S X <! a CM rH < CO § o W cn 2 CO 
i>1 0 I H O > Q p 1 1 s 1 p X X o 1 c/j 
CO Q < < u u Q Q p p p s p p p p p in CO > 
0 
P 
G 
o 
0* 
0 
P 
G 
0 
•H 
P 
•rH 
0 
•rH 
G 
D1 
O 
< 
"d 
0 
P 
u 
0 
i—i 
o 
to 
p 
G 
0 
G ^ 
d 0 
CU G 
0 0 
a •H 
P 
G 
> 0 
d C4 
53 
P 
0 
0 CA 
0 r0 
G G 
0 P 
4H 
0 rd 
Q 0 
•H 
4H P 
0 •H 
0 
P 0 
G d 
0 p 1 o G 
}H D 
d 
P 
0 H4 
P r- 
CA 
i—1 
w u 
u 0 
p JO 
D 0 
O p 
CO o 
o 
G 
O 
P 
N
O
T
E
S
: 
*
 
C
l
a
s
s
i
f
i
e
d
 
d
a
ta
 
e
le
m
e
n
t 
*
*
 
C
o
lu
m
n
s
 
(7
) 
+
 
(8
) 
d
iv
id
e
d
 
b
y
 
l
/
2
(
(
2
)
+
(
5
)
)
 
67 
gran: inception confinris the widely held view that weapon sys¬ 
tem costs are underestimated. Figure 4, a plot of the Table 
2 data, is descriptive, indicating a positive correlation 
between cost growth g and time t (columns (4) and (3) of 
Table 2). 
This relationship can yield a hardware undercosting fac¬ 
tor comparable to the manpower undercosting factor w^/w^. 
Statistical tests to yield confidence intervals on the under¬ 
costing factor will net be valid for reasons to be discussed 
in the next paragraph. Consequently an "average” value for 
r /r must suffice. The estimate is obtained by first de- 
p u u 
riving a (modified) least squares fit between the weighted 
program cost growth factors g and the time since program in¬ 
ception t, with cost growth required to be zero at program 
inception. The mean program length (column (2) of Table 2) 
is then used to choose a point yielding the estimate for 
average cost growth per unit. The inverse of this figure 
will be the undercosting factor for hardware. 
IV. 1.2.2 Statistical validity of hardware ur.der- 
costing factor r^/r . Formal statistical analysis (beyond 
——- . 
point estimation) is not valid for at least two reasons. 
First, there is no a priori knowledge of the form of the 
error term in the regression equation—for example whether 
it is additive or multiplicative. Nor are there adequate 
data points to derive the likely form*. Second, the data 
g
(t
) 
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points are not independent. It seems to be the case that 
system costs can be altered by borrowing the appropriations 
53 
from one program to shore up another. Such "borrowing" 
is most feasible in the support areas. Transportation costs, 
for example, could be assinged to one program when goods are 
shipped for another. It may be the case that one program 
then grows relative to the others (see the extreme case, for 
example, of Condor on Table 2). The importance of such pos¬ 
sibilities for the current study are that the observations 
are not independent, and thus parametric analysis is invali¬ 
dated. Nonetheless "best fitting" in the least squares 
sense remains useful, for if one system is overcosted on a 
per unit basis due to borrowing from it, others must be un¬ 
dercosted. Including all systems will therefore still pro- 
5 
vide a reasonable relationship between cost growth and time. 
An ancillary argument in favor of considering cost 
growth on a per unit basis, rather than on the normal program 
53 
Hard evidence on this conclusion is not available, and 
the opinion must be considered the author’s own based on cir¬ 
cumstantial evidence only. 
54 
A caveat is proper since "all" systems are not in¬ 
cluded in the analysis, specifically systems not yet under 
procurement may interact in the borrowing sense from those 
considered here. This type of borrowing is less likely, but 
possible. The possibility is considered less serious than 
the alternative of including developmental systems with 
their inherent costing inaccuracies. Also, see section V.3 
concerning systems not included in the SAR process. 
70 
55 
cost basis, results from the "borrowing" theory. If one 
program is cannibalized to provide funds for another, the 
end result does not show up in program cost totals, for each 
will still be shown to cost their original amounts. But if 
the cannibalization results in a decrease in the amount of 
units eventually forthcoming in the cannibalized program, 
the effect will be reflected in the unit cost of weapons pro¬ 
duced by that program. Thus Condor for example shows that 
the total program cost actually declined, yet because of the 
5 6 
decrease in units, its per unit cost climbed dramatically. 
IV.1.2.3 The relationship between cost growth g 
and time t. The mechanics of obtaining the required rela¬ 
tion between g and time since program inception t are the 
following. It is felt important to allow for convex and 
concave, as well as linear relationships, as cost growth 
will obviously be sensitive to the differences of the three 
curves demonstrated in Figure 5. This figure characterizes 
the following arbitrary one-parameter functions, one of which 
is to be selected: 
55 
Total program cost growth rather than unit cost in¬ 
creases are the basis for the analyses in [61], [62], [63], 
[76]. More recently, GAO has begun expressing growth in 
per unit terms [64]. 
“^Condor is again used as an example because of its ex¬ 
tremities, not for any specific knowledge of its program 
management. It is quite possible the per unit growth is due 
to non-linearity in unit costs relative to number of units 
produced. 
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g (t) = 1.0 + yt + d 
a — 
(14) 
gb(t) = (1.0eY-)-d (15) 
g (t) = In(e + yt + d) (16) 
Figure 5 Characteristic cost growth relationships 
In these, g is shown as a function of t, e is the natural 
logarithm base, y is the growth parameter, and d represents 
57 
the residual of the descriptive linear regression. The 
functional form of d is chosen to allow linearization of the 
three relationships. Each of the relations inherently yields 
a cost growth factor of 1 at t=0 (meaning at the time of the 
development estimate the cost growth since the development 
estimate is zero—an obvious requirement and one which does 
4 
not have the usual problems associated with forcing the re¬ 
gression line through an arbitrary intercept point, for sta- 
~^See Goldberger [19, p. 157]. 
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tistical tests are not to be invoked anyway). The form of 
g(t) selected is to be the one yielding the largest coeffi- 
. 2 
cient of determination R . The estimate for the growth pa¬ 
rameter y then results from using the selected form of g(t) 
in the least squares regression. This is an admittedly ar¬ 
bitrary decision rule which could be refined, but the in¬ 
sensitivity cf the results probably makes refinement unpro¬ 
ductive. 
Table 4 provides the results of the various regressions. 
2 
The logarithmic form g^ has the largest R , and yields the 
least squares estimate y*~0.19. To obtain the estimated 
hardware cost growth, a value for t is required for inser¬ 
tion into the formula 
g (t) = ln(e + 0.191) (17) 
This t value is obtained by finding the average program 
length (wieghted by relative size) and arbitrarily taking 
80% of the result. The 80% factor reflects the fact that 
the bulk of weapon units associated with a program are de¬ 
livered sometime before the program ends. 
The average program length obtained from columns (1) 
and (2) of Table 2 is 9.57 years. 80% of which is 7.66 
years. The cost growth estimate for g, g*, is therefore 
1.43 from (17), and the hardware undercosting factor 1/g* 
is 0.70. This value, which is the required estimate for 
r^/r^, can be compared with the value obtained for manpower 
I 
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TABLE 4 — Comparison of Least Squares Regression for 
Different Forms of g(t) Applied to Data of Table 2. 
Case a Case b Case c 
Functional Form: g=l+yt+d g=leY-- d g=ln(e+yt+d) 
Linear Form: g=l+yt+d lng=yt+lnd e^=e+yt+d 
R2: .0155 <0 .0181 
l(g-g*)2 10.63 11.41 10.19 
Y*: .0313 .0233 .192 
NOTE: The case b 
2 
entry for R can be negative since the 
forced regression line in that case v/orse approximation 
than the overall mean. Using R 2 - 1 - SSE SSE T, bbh = sum of 
squared deviations , SST = total sum of squares, if SSE 
exceeds SST, then R2 < 0. 
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undercosting, which was w /w = 0.71. The similarity of 
P ** 
these values does not support hypothesis 1, which would re¬ 
quire the manpower undercosting factor to be significantly 
lower than the hardware undercosting factor. 
2 
In Table 4, the quantities I(g-g*) for each functional 
form are presented to indicate the insensitivity of the re- 
2 
suits to the selected form. The relation between R and 
2 
E(g-g*) is not direct, but again the logarithmic form is 
slightly preferred. 
IV. 1.2.4 Significance of results on hardware cost- 
growth . The most obvious elements of Table 4 are the ex- 
2 
tremely low values of the determination coefficient R . 
Normally this indicates the results are totally insignificant, 
and that while the estimate for the growth factor y exists, 
no confidence can be placed in it. For research purposes we 
must agree that this essentially invalidates meaningful con¬ 
clusions on hardware undercosting and therefore on cost bias. 
We can only conclude that the estimates for g and b do not 
support hypothesis 1, but by no means has it been disproved. 
However there are some important matters left unsaid in 
that simple statistical summary. First, a glance at Figure 
4 certainly indicates that cost growth, even with inflation 
and engineering adjustments abstracted, is positive. The low 
2 
R values only mean thwt there are other factors besides t 
affecting g. Low R terms do not prove that t is unimportant. 
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2 
Second, and most crucially, the low R values may re¬ 
sult because of program cost dependence, that is, borrowing 
from one program to make another look better can cause ex¬ 
treme variations in cost growth. This would cause lower va.l~ 
2 
ues of R . Assume, for example, that the extreme per unit 
cost growth in the Condor system resulted largely because 
Condor was cannibalized to help other programs. Then the 
Condor cost growth factor g would be high and the programs 
helped would be lower. This effect causes variation in the 
data points. Abstracting Condor from the analysis as a 
2 
"wild point" would raise the R values significantly (recal- 
2 
ling that R reflects squared deviations), but is completely 
improper. With all programs retained in the analysis, if 
inter-program "borrowing" takes place then the sura of squared 
deviations from a regression 3.ine may be large, but at least 
the estimate for the average g value will not be compromised. 
Abstracting Condor would lower g*, but g* with Condor is more 
realistic. 
Finally, simply abstracting inflation from the cost 
growths hides some problems. The SAR cost data is provided 
by the combined efforts of DoD personnel and contractors 
producing the systems. Both these components are naturally 
biased toward attributing cost growth to uncontrollable fac¬ 
tors such as inflation rather than blaming their own estima¬ 
tion and planning abilities. It could well follow that the 
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cost growth estimates used to obtain Table 4 are understated 
5 8 
...but by how much is unavailable. 
Summarizing the discussion on cost bias, we can say the 
following. Both manpower and hardware seem to be undercosted. 
The best evidence is that such undercosting is approximately 
/ 
the same, leading to a conclusion that cost bias is near zero. 
This conclusion is founded, however, on very weak evidence 
from a statistical viewpoint. Hypothesis 1 is not supported, 
but cannot be rejected on statistical grounds. 
IV.2 Investigation of Hypothesis 2 
IV.2.1 The variables and causality. The cause of 
shifts over time in hardware/manpower ratios is assumed to 
be caused by changes in the factor price ratio. The elas¬ 
ticity of substitution (under the previously argued assump¬ 
tion of Hicks neutral technical progress) then becomes the 
parameter of central interest. Starting in 1955, data on 
government asset value has been required by the U.S. Congress’ 
House Committee on Government Operations. The availability 
of this data allows empirical exercise of the models pre¬ 
sented in the previous chapter. 
Table 5 provides the time series data between overall 
hardware/manpower ratios (H/M)^, estimated incremental hard¬ 
ware/manpower ratios (h/m)*, and (w/r)*, which represents the 
CO 
Such undercosting bias is inherent if not explicit in 
the evidence provided in Ponald Fox's informative study on 
Defense system acquisition [16, especially pp. 159-165]. 
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term [(w/r)(w/r^)] of equation (11). These series result 
from independent evaluations of hardware, manpower, and 
their annual increments, with 1967 as the base year. The 
details of the data sorting and adjustment are largely con¬ 
tained in the appendix, as the source note to Table 5 indi¬ 
cates. For now, it*will perhaps aid the discussion to give 
examples of hew each of these quantities is ultimately ob¬ 
tained from the tables, and to review their definitions. 
(H/M)^ is simplified notation for (H^/M^). is ob¬ 
tained from Table 13, column (5), and represents the total 
value of Navy hardware assets at time t in 1967 dollars. M 
is obtained from Table 27 and represents the actual number 
of men required to man the level of hardv/are. Therefore 
(II/M) is the hardware/manpower ratio associated with all 
systems in the weapon stock at time t (the term "system" in¬ 
cludes both hardv/are and manpower—an aircraft is not a sys¬ 
tem unless it is manned). 
Gross new hardware delivered in period t, h^, and man¬ 
power m^ required by h^, cannot be directly obtained because 
of the myriad system procurements which occur, and because 
of the interdependencies between system utilizations of the 
input factors. However the annual expenditures shown in the 
U.S. Budget for new system procurement provide estimates for 
gross expenditures in period t, designated h£ and presented 
in Table 12. If expenditures are assumed to match deliveries 
78 
then these plus the sequential values for (H/M) provide the 
w 
(h/m)* estimates. This process is explained in Table 11*s 
comments. The (h/m)* values of Table 11 represetn the in¬ 
duced hardware/manpower ratio associated with the gross addi¬ 
tion h to hardware stock H^. They therefore serve as an 
estimate for (h/m)^. They also reflect the assumptions of 
the previous chapter that retired hardware has the inherent 
factor ratio (K/M)^. 
The price ratio (w/r)£ is obtained from Table 9, column 
(5). There is an assumption relating hardware procurement 
costs and rental costs in this ratio which should be made ex¬ 
plicit. is the manpower required at time t and is its 
cost per man-year, that is w^ is the "rental" cost of man¬ 
power. On the other hand H is hardware stock and r^ should, 
for consistency, also be the rental cost of hardware. Yet 
the Commerce Department price indices for hardware goods are 
based on purchase prices rather than rentals. In this study, 
the importance of the (w/r) ratios lies in their trends ra¬ 
ther than their absolute values. Therefore the values (w/r) 
and (w/r)* can be validly used so long as the following 
assumption holds: Hardware purchase prices and hardware 
rentals are directly related. More formally, hardware ren¬ 
tals are linearly dependent on purchase prices. 
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TABLE 5 — Derived Annual Values for Overall Hardware/Man¬ 
power Ratios (H/M), Incremental Hardware/Manpower Ratios 
(h/m)*, and Cost-of-Manpower to Cost of Hardware Ratio (w/r)*. 
Fiscal H/M (h/m)* (w/r)* 
Year (1) (2) (3) 
1955 (45.17) — 0.89 
6 44.87 41.55 0.85 
7 42.25 16.71 0.83 
8 39.73 22.19 0.83 
9 39.85 40.48 0.86 
1960 44.95 94.31 0.86 
1 47.35 66.63 0.88 
2 50.49 76.01 0.88 
3 53.88 76.23 0.89 
4 55.18 65.53 0.94 
1965 56.88 74.04 0.96 
6 54.41 29.30 0.99 
7 55.47 65.17 1.00 
8 58.30 81.21 1.00 
9 57.12 48.22 1.03 
1970 60.21 84.59 1.11 
1 63.61 92.31 1.13 
2 62.99 57.89 1.25 
3 62.67 59.88 1.34 
4 61.98 55.29 (1.36) 
NOTES: Column (1) is the ratio of column (5) of Table 13 
to the M. values of Table 27. Column (2) is derived in 
Table 11? Column (3) is obtained from Table 9. 
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IV. 2.2 Intuitive Observations on H/m, h/m, and (w/r)*. 
Table 5 is visually presented in Figure 6, which is a semi- 
logarithmic plot. There are several points of interest 
available from this figure. Most of these will be investi¬ 
gated quantitatively, but a preliminary glance is illuminat¬ 
ing. 
IV.2.2.1 Consistency in w/r trends and resulting 
implications. Since (w/r)* and (w/r)^ are directly related, 
the terms will be used interchangeably in much of the follow¬ 
ing. First, there is a rather consistent exponential rise in 
wage/hardware cost ratio v.T/r, which is accompanied by a less 
consistent, but still obvious rise in H/M. Notably absent 
is any step increase in w/r, such as might be expected in 
1968 when federal wages were raised to provide comparability 
59 
with private industry. The smoothness of the w/r trend 
prevents any verifiable conclusions about the form of techni¬ 
cal progress. Has a discontinuity occurred, then a (lagged) 
response to this discontinuity by the hardware/manpower ra¬ 
tios would have allowed determining hew much of the rising 
trend could be attributed to price changes (substitution 
59 
Congressional legislation pegged federal salaries to 
the Department of Labor's Professional Administrative and 
Technical (PAT) Survey. The transition was to start in Novem 
ber 1967 and be completed by July 1, 1969. Large pay increas 
es in fact occurred in fiscal 1968 [73, p. 135], but indices 
for capital goods increased comparably, as can be seen from 
columns (1) and (4) of Table 9. Note July 1, 1968, is the 
end of fiscal year 1968 in that table. 
(w
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6 0 
elasticity), and how much to labor-saving technical progress. 
A sudden rise in w/r with no change in the h/m trend or the 
lagged H/M trend would indicate that hardware/manpower ratios 
respond to the bias in technical progress only, and that 
61 
prices have no effect. A rise in h/m and lagged H/M that 
proportionally matches the w/r rise would indicate a substi¬ 
tution elasticity of unity (assuming the trend increase in 
both time series had been abstracted). 
In contrast to the lack of response of w/r to the 1968 
pay increases, the fiscal 1972 All-Volunteer Force (AVF) pro¬ 
gram seems to be reflected in the slight rise in w/r after 
1971. Unfortunately, 1972 is too recent for any effects in 
H/M to be considered, especially since the end of the Vietnam 
conflict confounds the data. Follow on studies can investi¬ 
gate the AVF effect, though they will tend to also be con¬ 
founded by the fact that high inflation rates coincided with 
the AVF, so the w/r rise is not so dramatic as it might have 
been. 
^See section II.7.1. 
61 
Defense is still considered a price taker. It must 
be added that if technical progress is of the induced form 
(see section II. 7.2) then a resulting change in hardware/ 
manpower ratios may result. The only perceptable difference 
then between substitution effects and induced technical bias 
would be a longer time lag until response if technology must 
be developed (induced) rather than available already (sub¬ 
stitution) . 
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IV.2.2.2 Post-war disruptions in the data. Post¬ 
war periods have disrupting effects of the data, though the 
disruptions do provide insights. If 1965 and 1972 are taken 
to be the first post-war years for Korea and Vietnam, then 
the K/M ratio is seen to decrease noticeably for the subse¬ 
quent three years in both cases. While that is consistent 
with the 1956-60 drop in the w/r trend, it is not consistent 
with the post-Vietnam w/r data. A likely interpretation is 
that post-war sentiment produces an overwhelming political 
force, which temporarily drowns out purely economic consider¬ 
ations. Popular demands to "stand-down" from the war posture 
manifest themselves in large cutbacks in weapon units after 
6 2 
a war, regardless of what relative prices do. For con¬ 
tractual reasons weapon cuts cannot be matched by equivalent 
manpower cuts, as enlistment terms must be honored. Fur¬ 
thermore, servicemen are less anxious to leave the military 
when the economy is unhealthy. In both post-war periods GNP 
C *5 
declined. Such periods cause downward Defense budget pres¬ 
sures and less desire for servicemen to leave their secure 
military jobs. Both these phenomena can be simultaneously 
accommodated by large cutbacks in military hardware relative 
go t 
Total active ships, for example, dropped from 973 to 
890 between 1956 and 1958, and from 702 to 593 from 1971 to 
1973. In neither case was there an equivalent drop in man¬ 
power. See Tables 15 and 28. 
^See [30, p. 1] for a comparison of the two post-war 
economics. 
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to military manpower, providing an explanation for the post¬ 
war trends. 
Considerations such as the above make it important to 
select the data base carefully. A biased result would occur 
if the entire time span of available data from 1955 to 1974 
were used. Instead, the conclusions will rely on the perhaps 
obvious cycle from the end of the Korean war to the end of 
Vietnam, that is, from 1956 to 1972. The quantitative re¬ 
sults will be derived accordingly. 
IV.2.3 Putty/clay and the capital intensity/labor in¬ 
tensity argument again. Before turning to those, however, 
Figure 6 provides further insights which may help place the 
underlying theory in perspective, especially the "putty/clay" 
character of the assumed model. To do so requires a compari¬ 
son of the h/m and H/M series of Figure 6 (or Table 5). 
The relation between h/m and H/M demonstrates two effects, 
both resulting from the putty-clay assumption. First, since 
any change in the overall H/M ratio is embodied in new equip¬ 
ments , the H/M ratio can only fall (rise) if h/m is less than 
(greater than) H/M. Second, given the direction of movement 
of K/M, the gap between PI/M and h/m for any given year will 
be inversely related to the size of that year's procurement 
expenditure. Thus, if expenditures (new systems) are small 
relative to existing hardware, then a unit rise in H/M will 
require a higher h/m embodied in the new systems than if ex- 
penditures were relatively large. These comments can be 
demonstrated more formally. Analyzing equation (10) of 
Chapter III the following can be derived: 
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(H/M) 
(H/M)t[Hfc(1-6)+Rt]+(h/m)thfc 
t+1 H. (1-6)+R +h. 
t t t 
(10) 
Therefore 
A (H/M) t : (H/M) t+i-(E/M) t= <£> ,-(§•). 
m t M t 
h. 
t 
Lht+«tJ 
(10f) 
where = H (1-6) + R^. 
H represents hardware carried forward at time t. 
The first factor of (101) in brackets shows that the 
directional change of H/M depends on whether h/m exceeds 
H/M. The second factor shows that the rate of change in 
H/M depends on how large gross new investment h is compared 
to carried forward stock H. 
The close relationship between h/m and K/M is important 
for analytic reasons. Under conditions of substitutability 
64 
ex ante and ex post (putty-putty) the H/M time series 
could be regressed against the (w/r)* series without major 
violation of underlying statistical assumptions, specific¬ 
ally the independence of observations. At each time point, 
t 
the proper ratio of K to M would be based on the usual mar- 
6 4 
Plus the usual assumptions of perfect competition, 
including the alternative of trading existing assets at 
market value for substitutes—or equivalently, if capital 
is "Perfectly malleable". 
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ginal productivity concepts, and H/M ratios would track 
(w/r)* ratios depending on the elasticity of substitution A. 
If the implicit production function had constant elasticity 
A, then A could be estimated and statistically tested from 
a knowledge of H/M and (w/r)* only.^ This would be com¬ 
pletely valid only if hardware in stock and manpower were 
exchangeable each year—i.e., if the economic requirements 
of perfect competition prevailed. But since a large amount 
of any one year’s system are those already on hand from the 
previous year, one runs into the following difficulty when 
H/M and (w/r)* are compared directly: if defense budgets 
are squeezed to the point where no new procurement occurs 
(ht=G) then the fixed factor assumption means H/M cannot 
change with (w/r)*. The conclusion then that A was zero, 
which follows if capital is costlessly malleable, would be 
wrong. Less extremely, if procurement budgets are small, 
then H/M cannot change very much, and would be underesti¬ 
mated. It seems important, then, that only the incremental 
acquisitions, that is h/m, be compared to (w/r)* changes. 
Therein lies one possible explanation for the incon¬ 
sistencies between operators who claim equipment has become 
too sophisticated (indicating excessive capital intensity), 
and analysts who claim a need for greater capital intensi¬ 
ty—the controversy which inspired the present research. 
65 
This is the approach implicit in [86]. 
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The former base their conclusions on the new goods they are 
provided, the latter on aggregated goods, old and new. The 
divergency of viewpoint is strengthened if new procurement 
is decreasing as a fraction of total asset value, a fact of 
recent budget trends. 
The argument for comparing (w/r)* to h/m instead of H/M 
can more formally be stated by noting that (H/M) is highly 
dependent on (H/M)The normal statistical approach to 
such autoregressivity is to use first differences of the 
6 6 
time series. From equation (10), it is apparent that h/m 
is a function of the first differences of H/M, so we shall 
remain close to standard theory. However, we will not want 
to take first differences of the dependent variable (w/r)* 
as would be standard if the intertemporal dependence was be- 
6 7 
tween sequential random errors. Instead, h/m will be re¬ 
gressed on (w/r)* directly. 
It can be seen that the putty-clay model manifests it¬ 
self analytically in the H/M, (h/m)*, (w/r)*, relationships. 
The extreme variability inherent in h/m compared to H/M will 
produce less confidence in any estimate for X. More import¬ 
antly, the large stock of hardware carried forward from year 
to year means that values of X derived from (h/m)* trends 
will be significantly larger in magnitude than those derived 
^See Goldberger [19, pp. 236-8]. 
^Ibid. , equation 4.34. 
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from H/M trends. 
IV.2.4 Quantitative Results. The data in Table 5 is 
analyzed in statistical terms in this subsection. The main 
point will be to estimate X based on equation (11) of Chap¬ 
ter III, and repeated here: 
(h/m) t *» [ (w/r) t/(w/r) Q] X (h/m) Q (11) 
or (h/m)t = A'[(w/r)*]X (11*) 
where A' = (h/m)^, (w/r)* = [(w/r) /(w/r)q] and the base 
year 0 is 1967. To stress some of the previous comments, 
the regression of H/M on (w/r)* will also be presented. 
In order to utilize (11), several assumptions must be 
invoked. First, changes in h/m are caused by changes in 
(w/r)*. Also, observations on h/m result from (11), and 
multiplicative error terms e which are independent log-norm¬ 
ally distributed. For estimation purposes, (11') becomes: 
(h/m)t = A'[(w/r)*]X-e. 
The assumption of log-normality is justified by calling on 
the Multiplicative Central Limit Theorem, which, stated non- 
rigorously, ensures that the distribution of products of in- 
6 8 
An analogous situation evolves if shifts in factor 
ratios are attributed to technical bias. The bias factor 
must be larger if technical progress is embodied in new 
raachies than if progress is disembodied. A closely related 
example is in Solow [51, p. 95], especially his conclusion 
that estimates of the technical progress growth factor are 
lower for disembodied progress than embodied progress. 
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dependent random variables tends toward log-normality in the 
limit [19, p. 216]. 
The distribution of the error term allows linearizing 
(11) into the following form: 
ln(h/m) = In A' + Aln(w/r)* + lne 
If In x=x"r, this becomes 
(h/M)+ = (A')+ + A[(w/r)*]+ + e+ 
To utilize the classical linear regression model, e+ must 
2 
be normally distributed with mean 0 and constant variance c , 
which is consistent with the assumption that z is log-normal. 
Since only the economic effects of changes in factor 
price ratios are being considered, we should expect the 
error term e+ to be large. It must absorb the effects of 
such elements as political, bureaucratic, and technical fac¬ 
tors which unpredictably effect hardware/manpower ratios. 
That the factor price ratio can only explain a limited amount 
2 
of the variation in h/m will be inherent in the small R of 
the results. 
It should be stated explicitly that the series (h/m)* 
and (w/r)* (as well as H/M) are assumed to be the correct 
series for the quantities they represent. However, as the 
appendix will clearly indicate, the derivations of these 
series are necessarily indirect. While these are based on 
the rationale presented in Chapter II, the absence of an 
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output measure for "National Security" means that these deri¬ 
vations are sometimes arbitrary, and possibly contain unknown 
biases. The results must be interpreted, therefore, with 
caution. The data manipulations are included in an appendix 
because of the dry detail involved—but the research results 
are based on these details, and the appendix is therefore 
central to the conclusions. 
IV.2.4.1 The estimates for substitution elasticity 
■ ■  — —.— - — — nr, —— , — - ■ ■ — .JU 
X. The results of the various regressions are presented in 
Table 6. The multiplicative factor A in each case is unim¬ 
portant, but can not be pre-specified without seriously bias¬ 
ing the estimate for X by forcing the regression through an 
arbitrary intercept. It is therefore included in the estima¬ 
tion process. Since 1967 is chosen as the base year for 
(w/r), then A* represents the regression intercept at time 
1967. 
According to the model selected, the elasticity of sub¬ 
stitution is estimated using the data of Table 5 by the max¬ 
imum likelihood estimate X* = 1.74. This coincides with the 
incremental (putty-clay) model for the 1956-72 time period. 
2 
The coefficient of determination R is low as must be ex¬ 
pected, and the 90,% confidence interval includes the value 
A=0. This means, in a hypothesis test of A=0, that the hy¬ 
pothesis cannot be rejected. 
The incremental model for the 1955-74 period yields a 
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TABLE 6 — Results of Regressing Forms of Hardware/Manpower 
Ratios On i Factor Price Ratios for Alternative Time Periods. 
Model H/M = h[(w/r) *]e h/m = A [ (w/r) *) e 
Time Frame 1955-74 1956-72 1955-74 1956-72 
MLE for A 0.855 1.13 0.952 1.74 
90% Conf. 
Int. for A (0.64, 
1.07) 
(0.86, 
1.40) 
(-0.27, ( 
2.17) 
-0.02, 
3.50) 
0 
Coef. of 
Det. R2 
0.722 .775 0.098 0.167 
24LE for A* 52.98 54.93 55.70 59.86 
NOTES: Results obtained from data included in 
Table 5. 
"24LL" is 24axirr.um Likelihood Estimate 
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A* of .952, and the hypothesis A=0 again cannot be rejected 
at the 90% level with this data. The lower value of A* is 
due to the drop in h/m ratios following the Vietnam War. 
The result is felt to be biased downward by including two 
post-war periods but only one war (Vietnam). 
The results for the H/M model are statistically satis- 
2 
fying as evidenced by the large R and smaller confidence 
intervals, but are considered invalid for the reasons previ¬ 
ously given. 
Overall, the evidence does not allow rejecting, on a 
statistical basis, the hypothesis that the substitution 
elasticity is zero. Nonetheless, the maximum likelihood 
estimate for substitution elasticity in the 1956-72 time 
frame is 1.74. This certainly suggests that capital intens¬ 
ification has occurred. More obviously, while the hypothe¬ 
sis A=0 cannot be rejected, there is little in Table 6 that 
supports the hypothesis. 
IV.2.5 An oversight, and Fellnerfs first proposition. 
To avoid clouding of an already complex analysis, an import¬ 
ant factor has been ignored. This was done largely because 
the factor could not be accounted for empirically. The dis¬ 
cussion will lead back to Fellner's first proposition relat¬ 
ing to the foresight of planners (see section II.7.3). 
We have assumed that h^, the gross new hardware ob¬ 
tained in period t is estimated by the procurement expendi- 
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tures of period t. That in itself is not totally accurate, 
but there is a more important matter implicit in that assump¬ 
tion and the use of equation (11) to estimate X. Systems 
delivered in period t, are not used only in period t, but 
have a long expected life. Assume this life span is the 
same for all systems and is 10 years. Then it is not only 
(w/r) which should determine the h/m ratio, but some combin¬ 
ation of (w/r)^ through (w/r)^^. This combination is felt 
impossible to determine, and the present research avoids the 
entire issue of how one properly combines series of inputs 
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with series of outputs. Rather, the following rationale 
is implicitly used. 
Empirically, w/r ratios have historically risen over 
time (see Figure 6). If planners count on this rise, then 
they will, in accordance with Fellner's first proposition, 
choose systems more capital intensive than is indicated by 
the prices at delivery time. This follows since the above 
derivations for X are based on delivery times, since "de¬ 
livery times" are the beginning of the system utilization 
period, and since w/r is expected to rise during that period, 
If planners integrate these rising prices into their deci¬ 
sions, but the analysis does not, then the estimates for X 
will reflect the analytic oversight by seeming high. Spe- 
^Sir John Hicks explores the matter in his 1973 bock, 
which is based on the problem. lie develops "...an elementary 
process that converts a sequence...of inputs into a sequence 
of outputs." [27, p. 8]. 
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cifically, equation (11) utilizes (w/r) as the ratio influ¬ 
encing planners, while planners implicitly use some inte¬ 
grated value of (w/r) t through (w/r)t+1Q. Tllis integrated 
value will exceed (w/r)^; if it were used instead then the 
estimate for A would be lower. 
But this conceptual problem should be viewed within the 
overall priorities of the research. Factor ratios were 
3hown, in Chapter I, to be popular with defense analysts and 
critics. This research has tried to base such ratios and 
their use on some reasonably acceptable theoretical basis. 
The fact that the models developed are not perfect should 
not imply they are of no value at all. 
In the next chapter some of the above conclusions, 
their implications, and some further cautionary matters, 
will be presented. 
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS, INTERPRETATIONS, AND CAVEATS — 
A SUMMING UP 
V.1 Conclusions 
Two models have been developed on v/hat seem to be rea¬ 
sonable theoretical grounds. The first model compares at 
some point in time planned hardware/manpower ratios (h/m)_ 
Jtv 
with economically proper ratios (h/m)^. This is done in 
equation (7), which is repeated here. 
(h/m)R = bX . (h/m)v (7) 
In (7), b is a measure of cost bias and X is substitution 
elasticity. 
The second model compares hardware/manpower ratios at 
different time points. Equation (13) is a function of 
changes in price ratios and substitution elasticity: 
(h/m)t = [ (w/r) t/(w/r) Q] A (h/m) Q (11) 
These models could be used to predict the effects of 
changes in policy which affected cost bias or changes in 
anticipated price ratios if the parameter b and X were 
known. Since they were not, the research instead opted to 
estimate them using U.S. Navy data. 
It was found that both manpower and hardware have been 
priced, by planners, at approximated 70% of true accounting 
value, thus indicating zero cost bias, or b*=l. However no 
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confidence interval on b* could be obtained because the 
classical assumptions did not hold. 
Under the assumptions of putty/clay capital accumula¬ 
tion and therefore embodied technical change, the best esti¬ 
mate for substitution elasticity X was found to be X*=1.74, 
with 90% confidence interval (-0.2, 3.50) for the 1956-72 
data base. If technical change was not attributed only to 
new systems (that is if it was disembodied), then the esti¬ 
mate for X* was as low as .855, with 90% confidence inter¬ 
val (0.64, 1.07) for the 1955-74 base data. It is obvious 
(see Table 6) that both the embodiment question and the 
time frame considered have important effects on any inter¬ 
pretation of capital/labor changes. 
Enroute to the estimate for cost bias b, it was found 
that cost growth in weapon system acquisition is directly 
related to time since program inception, but seems to dis¬ 
play diminishing marginal increases. This is demonstrated 
in Figure 4, which shows the best estimated relationship 
g(t) = ln(e + ,19t) (17) 
to be increasing (positive first derivatives) with dimin¬ 
ishing slope (negative second derivative). The data tends 
to support the theory thatsystem cost growth is most domi¬ 
nant in the early stage of a program—perhaps because of 
pressures (by DoD, Manufacturers, and some Congressmen) for 
low estimates. If the estimates are artificially low, the 
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cost growth will become apparent quite early in the produc¬ 
tion cycle. However, the data is so weak statistically that 
one can only say this may be the case. Stronger conclusions 
than this are not supported by the data. 
V.2 Interpretations 
The above empirical results of course prove nothing 
conclusively. Policy changes based on them would not be 
advised without further research. They do, however, serve 
to cast doubt on what may be preconceived theories for im¬ 
proving DoD efficiency. Since preventing erroneous policy 
may be as useful as prescribing valid policy, the effort 
seems worthwhile. 
Saving reservations on the conclusions for a later 
section and proceeding as though they are completely valid, 
the following interpretations emerge. 
V.2.1 Policies which improve estimation for only one 
factor may be counterproductive. While admittedly simplis¬ 
tic, equation (7) above should at least be considered before 
major changes to hardware or manpower costing procedures are 
finalized. If manpower, say, is undercosted by only 5% in 
the future while hardware is undercosted 30%, then system 
acquisition (recall that "systems" include both men and ma¬ 
chines) may become more capital intensive than is proper. 
The reasoning is obvious. Manpower suddenly seems more ex- 
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pensive to planners, so they purchase systems which use less 
of it. In terms of (7), b becomes greater than unity (b's 
definition was (v? /wu) / (r /ru)) , and (h/m)R exceeds (h/m)u, 
the economically correct h/m ratio. 
The above example is relevant. Recent and current dis¬ 
cussions on the military pay system concern shifting to a 
salary type scheme wherein the various current "fringe" 
benefits (medical, housing, retirement, commissary, etc.) 
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come out of the individual’s pay. Such policy would no 
doubt make it difficult to ignore manpower costs, but a 
classical problem of "second-best" could result. If both 
factors cannot be priced properly, it at first seems second- 
best to price one correctly. But if the goal is efficiency, 
it may be better to price both equally incorrectly than to 
choose the second best solution. Of course, the best action 
is to ensure that both factors are properly costed. 
V.2.2 Arguments for greater capital intensity may be 
ill-founded. The results of Table 6 seem to show that if 
anything, the rising trend in manpower costs relative to 
hardware costs have been answered with strong responses 
toward capital intensity—at least within the flexibility 
open to Defense planners. This tends to confirm statements 
by some Navy operating personnel that new systems are per- 
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See Binkin [5], for comments along this line and 
past proposals, such as the Hubbell pay plan. 
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haps over-sophisticated. 
Only if the total hardware held by the Navy is consid- 
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ered, and the artificial 1955-74 time frame is considered, 
does substitution elasticity seem low enough (0.85) to claim 
that response to rising labor prices has been inadequate. 
There are many caveats to that statement, and they will be 
stated in the next section. 
For now, it should at least be valid to say there 
seems grounds for synthesizing the two divergent viewpoints 
which opened this study. If one considers system changes 
to be disembodied, that is occuring to all systems held, 
then a lower rate of change of the hardware/manpower ratio 
has occured than if technical changes are assumed embodied 
in new systems only. This result, somewhat obvious on 
hindsight, is not clear from the literature commonly pub¬ 
lished by analysts of Defense natters, some of which was 
discussed in Chapter I. 
Furthermore, the result rests totally on the putty/ 
clay assumption. It is not altered by comments on what the 
correct substitution elasticity X is. Nor is it altered if 
X is variable, if the production function is non-homogeneous, 
or if the production function itself varies over time. 
1955 was a peak war year for Korea and 1974 was a 
post-war lull as far as U.S. military activity was concerned. 
The arguments for using 1956-72 are voiced in section IV.2.4. 
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These matters warrant discussion, but the apparent divergence 
between those arguing for greater capital intensity and those 
advising less can be synthesized even with the crude data 
available: The former could implicitly be considering total 
systems over one time frame, the latter incremental systems 
over a different time frame. The former could then obtain 
a substitution elasticity of 0.85, the latter one of 1.74. 
Then, if it is taken that substitution elasticity is constant 
and unity (the "Cobb-Douglas" assumption) each party justi¬ 
fies its argument. Even if A^l, there is still a basic dif¬ 
ference in the viewpoints, though it may become one of de¬ 
gree rather than kind. 
V.3 Some Caveats 
There have been numerous assumptions made in arriving 
at the tentative results of this study. It is time to 
highlight some of the more critical ones. They can be 
separated into theoretical issues and budgetary issues. 
V.3.1 Theoretical caveats. The theoretical caveats 
can be mentioned rather quickly, so long as it is stated 
that any or all of them could invalidate the results, but 
do not necessarily do so. Many have been mentioned previ¬ 
ously. Here we stress some which were not. 
First, while A* values ranging from 0.85 to 1.74 are 
estimated, there is no precedence for an assumption on the 
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proper range for substitution elasticity in Defense. The 
fact that A=1 may be correct for the economy's production 
of output can not be used to conclude a similar figure holds 
in DoD's production of "National Security." Furthermore A 
need not be constant. We can stay on the safe side by assum¬ 
ing the estimate desired was for a limited range of hardware/ 
manpower values. 
Homogeneity in the hardware factor has been treated 
rather strangely. It has been assumed that new hardware 
(h^) is homogeneous, and that old hardware is homogeneous, 
but that they are not homogeneous with each other since they 
have different manpower requirements. But then, once the 
new hardware is obtained, it becomes part of the old hard¬ 
ware, and the new and old combine to form the total hardware 
stock. This stock is now homogeneous again, and has a man¬ 
power intensity which is a weighted average of the two pre¬ 
vious quantities (h^ and H^). This type of hardware seems 
very convenient, being homogeneous when needed and then 
changing into a new homogeneous form at command. Whether 
such an assumption is acceptable or not is a personal choice. 
Homogeneity is implicit in some form in all aggregate models 
of physical capital, and is one reason why such models are 
not favored by many economists.11 Suffice it to say that the 
nHarcourt and Liang survey this controversy on capital 
theory in their introduction [22, pp. 9-44], 
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current study uses averaging techniques v/hich may be invalid 
in the opinions of many (can machines which use much labor 
be averaged with machines which use none to yield machines 
which use "some"?). 
On the cost bias portion of the study, it should be 
mentioned that the hardware costing considerations of section 
IV.1.2 were based on major weapon systems, since they are 
carefully monitored in the SAR process. However minor sys¬ 
tems (not in SAR) account for more expenditures than those 
in SAR. Reference [62] claims they comprise about 3 times 
the expenditures of major systems budget. It has been 
assumed here that the cost figures for SAR systems are 
representative of all systems. This may or may not be so. 
While a detailed analysis of the difference is not the pres¬ 
ent purpose, some evidence is available from [62]. 
In that study, the General Accounting Office (GAO) finds 
that over half of the minor systems studied had cost growths 
in excess of 50%, wTith the overall range of 16% to 213% [62, 
p. 2]. It seems apparent from the study that minor systems 
have cost growth problems similar to major systems, and in 
fact the GAO's recommendation was that DoD should subject 
minor systems to procedures similar to the SAR process in 
order to control costs. 
V.3.2 Budgetary caveats. The most important matter 
left unsaid in the research is probably the treatment of 
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Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) funds. 
A glance at Table 7 shows that RDT&E is a substantial part 
of the Navy budget: about 10% of the total in 1963 and 9% 
in 1973. Yet P.&D (for short) has not been included in our 
evaluation of hardware or manpower. The reason is that this 
allotment is practically impossible to assign to either 
weapon components or even to years. R&D expended this year 
may be reflected in next year's hardware, or in something 
to arrive in 20 years, or in something that never arrives 
at all...for example, how does one allocate the funds spent 
unsuccessfully developing the nuclear bomber. Also perplex¬ 
ing is the difficulty in determining hew much of the R&D 
funds should be attributed to manpower development. 
There are at least two conceptual ways to handle R&D 
expenditures. One is to assume it is essentially spent in 
hardware development (which seems to be the case) and to 
then increase the hardware value accordingly. Doing this 
would probably not affect the present results seriously, 
since the changes in ratios of hardware to capital v/ould 
be very similar, though the time phased ratios (H/M)f and 
72 
(h/m) would be larger in absolute value for all t. 
4 y— 
For example [ (h/m)-(h/m) and (a (h/m)./b (h/m) ^ ] Ate 
equal if a=b. Since R&D only changed from 10% to 9% of the 
budget in 10 years, it would seem major changes in h/m ratios 
would not result by inclusion of P.&D. (h/m) would be greater 
in each case by about 10%, i.e., a-b-1.1. 
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A second way to treat R&D, and the way it is implicitly 
treated in this study, is to essentially abstract it as fol¬ 
lows. Assume that R&D is the price for ensuring "proper" 
system development. This means that appropriate alternative 
systems exist to choose from. Thus, if changes in price ra¬ 
tios are anticipated, R&D funds are used partly to develop 
the types of systems which allow factor substitution to take 
place. This borders very much on the theory of induced tech¬ 
nical progress. With R&D abstracted as a constant fraction 
of the budget, R&D can be assumed used to ensure enough al¬ 
ternative systems exist, and exist at the right time, to let 
substitution between factors occur. Seen in this way, the 
difference between induced technical progress and factor 
substitution—an issue discussed in some detail in section 
II.7—becomes even less distinct, confirming the view that 
their difference is more conceptual than practical. 
Shifting to another budgeting caveat, this study has not 
made a clear distinction between expenditures and appropria¬ 
tions. The oversight may be significant in view of the early 
assumption that Defense budgets are fixed. In fact, appro¬ 
priations are what are fixed, while expenditures, the annual 
payments made and justified by appropriations, are not fixed- 
they must only add up, eventually, to the appropriation limit 
All that can be said in favor of treating expenditures as 
fixed is that appropriations are justified on the basis of 
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planned expenditures# and so long as programs proceed on 
schedule, the planned expenditure phasing is fixed. The 
seriousness of error in this assumption cannot be estimated 
at this time. 
The problem also comes into play because new hardware 
for year t, h^, is estimated from the actual expenditures in 
year t, rather than the expenditures planned for year t in 
some earlier year such as t-10. If expenditures do not match 
system delivery (such as if a firm is paid in advance to keep 
it solvent) then inaccuracies obviously result. All that can 
be done for both these problems is to assume that they are 
not overwhelming causes of bias in the results. 
V.4 Closing Statement 
In dealing with a subject so large as capital and labor 
tradeoffs in Defense, it would be impossible to itemize all 
the assumptions and caveats which exist. Whatever the hid¬ 
den problems, however, there does seem reason to at least 
consider the major indications of this research, which are 
here repeated: 
(1) Cost bias does not seem to have been significant 
in Defense hardware and manpower costing. Policies which 
change that balance should be considered carefully. 
(2) System accumulation has been such that capital/ 
labor ratios embodied in new systems are increasing faster 
than labor/capital cost ratios. Therefore arguments for 
even greater weapon sophistication may be premature. 
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NOTATION AND ABBREVIATIONS 
Notation: (Subscripts and superscript symbols are listed 
individually in alphabetical order or at end 
of section.) 
B: The fixed annual budget. 
b: Cost bias specifying proportional undercosting of 
manpower relative to hardware. b = (w /w )/(r /r ). 
p u P ** 
c, : Capital/Labor ratio associated with hardware being 
retired. 
d: Residual in descriptive linear regression. 
g(t): Unit Cost growth g, denoted as function of time 
since program inception t. 
H : Hardv/are stock at time t, valued in 1967 replacement 
cost. 
H : Hardware in stock at time t-1 and remaining at time 
t. Ht = Ht(l-6)+Rt. 
H/M: Ratio of hardware stock to its manpower requirement. 
ht: New hardware delivered during period t, where period 
t is from time to to t+1, measured in 1967 dollars. 
h/m: Ratio of new hardv/are to its manpower requirement. 
K^: Capital Stock at time t. 
k^: Hardware stock retired in period t. 
K/L: Capital/Labor ratio. 
L: Labor requirement. 
M: Manpower requirement for H. 
0 
n: Definition wholly contained in Table 15. 
p: Subscript indicating planning prices, wThich are 
prices assumed by planners to be in effect at time 
of system delivery. 
f 
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NOTATION AND ABBREVIATIONS (Continued) 
R^: Repair funds expended in period t. Also has defini¬ 
tion contained in Table 15. 
r: Unit price of hardware or capital input. Also has 
special definition wholly contained in Table 15. 
t: Historical time index. 
t: Time since program inception. 
u: Subscript indicating prices actually in effect at 
time a system is delivered. 
w: Unit price of manpower or labor input. Also has 
special definition wholly contained in Table 15. 
(w/r)*: The ratio of (w/r)t to (w/r)1Cg7r where (w/r)t 
is the factor price ratio in year t. 
5: Annual physical plus tactical depreciation rate for 
hardware. 
e: Random error term. 
y: Cost growth parameter for system cost growth. 
X: Elasticity of substitution. 
2 
a : Variance of random variable. 
+: Logarithmic superscript, i.e. y' = In y. 
*: Superscript indicating estimated value. Y* is an 
estimate for Y. (w/r)* has the special meaning 
above. 
Abbreviations: 
AVF: All Volunteer Force 
DoD: Department of Defense. 
O&M: Operations and Maintenance. 
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NOTATION AND ABBREVIATIONS (Continued) 
Abbreviations (Continued) 
PPR: Federal Real and Personal Property Inventory 
Reports. 
RDT&E: Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation 
Budget. 
R&D: Abbreviation for RDT&E. 
RTS: Rate of Technical Substitution. 
SAR: System Acquisition Reports. 
# 
APPENDIX A 
APPENDIX A 
DATA AND DATA ADJUSTMENTS 
A.1 General Comments 
The empirical results of Chapter IV depend on the data 
and data adjustments of this appendix. In hypothesis 1, the 
relationships between cost growth g and program time t hinge 
on the more elementary data contained herein. Similarly, in 
hypothesis 2 the time series H/M, h/m, and (w/r)* depend on 
the raw data and its refinement in this appendix. Thus, 
while the theoretical points of Chapter II and the model of 
Chapter III can stand on their own, the results of Chapter 
IV and the conclusions of Chapter V are valid only to the 
degree that they are not sensitive to inaccuracies in the 
data which are derived here. 
Two things are accomplished in this appendix. The first 
is to present the pertinent raw data. The second is to 
transform the raw data into useful forms. The transforma¬ 
tion procedures are completely described in the content notes 
of the tables and/or in the comments preceding the tables. 
The raw data is obtained from several sources, the principal 
of which are the following. The asset value of Navy proper¬ 
ty is obtained from the Federal Real and Personal Property 
Inventory Report published biennially in the prints of the 
House Committee on Government Operations [66] . The annual 
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fund flows which ultimately comprise Navy assets are based 
on the annual Budget of the U. S. Government [60]. Price 
indices are obtained from the Survey of Current Business 
[69] and associated Commerce Department publications. Most 
of the remaining sources are miscellaneous Department of De¬ 
fense publications. The source notes to the tables are spe¬ 
cific regarding raw data sources. 
Some of the tables to follow should prove useful, in 
their own right, to other researchers. The ratio of man- 
power on board versus that required (Table 30) proved to be 
an illusive series. The fraction of Navy ships which are 
active (Table 15), and the average ship age (Table 16) are 
also not widely held data. These represent data elements 
which planners, when questioned, usually stated to be un¬ 
available. Yet the interpretations of Defense efficiency, 
mentioned in Chapter I, are implicitly dependent on such 
data. The fact that Naval ships account for more than 30% 
73 
of teh total DoD acquisitions in weapons and equipment 
make them an important factor even in overall DoD studies. 
It must follow that variations in the fraction of these 
ships which are active (and therefore require crews) is 
important. It is especially important since the active 
73See [75, pp. 4 and 73]. DoD weapons and equipment 
are stated at 113 billion dollars. Navy ships at 35 billion. 
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fraction ranges from 0.36 to 0.80 (see Table 14). Further¬ 
more, the fact that average ship age varies from 10 years to 
17.7 years (1956 to 1974 timeframe, Table 14) has important 
implications; for the DoD inventory values as stated in 
House Committee on Government Operations biennial reports 
[66], are based on acquisition costs rather than replacement 
costs. Any conversion from acquisition cost to either cur¬ 
rent or constant dollars should account for ship age. 
The tables will be introduced, as necessary, by com¬ 
ments relevant to the present research. The amount of dis¬ 
cussion will depend on the apparent sensitivity of the re¬ 
sults to the data under consideration. Data felt to be 
tenuous will be so indicated. 
A.2 Comments on Data and Data Sources 
Several important issues relating to Defense asset 
eavluation are implicit in the appendix tables and therefore 
in the research. The discussion will be aided if the rela¬ 
tive magnitudes of the Navy budget categories included in 
the U.S. Budget are kept in mind. Table 7 provides the bud¬ 
get categories and their respective outlays for 1973 and 
1963. These sample years will suit present purposes. 
Two major budget categories in the table and their 
treatment pertain to the investigation of hypothesis 2. The 
first concerns the "0 & M" budgets, the second the "RDT&E" 
TABLE 7 — Relative Budget Sizes of Navy Expenditures as 
Represented by Fiscal 1973 & 1963 Outlays (Billions of 
Dollars) 
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Budget Category Outlays 
U.S. Navy Only: 
Military Personnel (MILPERS) 
Navy 
Navy Reserve 
Operations and Maintenance (O&M) 
Navy 
Navy Reserve 
Procurement 
Aircraft and Missiles 
Shipbuilding/Conversion 
Other 
Research, Dev., Test, Eval (RDT&E) 
Military Construction 
Navy 
Navy Reserve 
1973 1963 
5.390 
0.220 
2.714 
0.079 
5.196 
0.114 
2.864 
3.181 
1.982 
1.665 
3.230 
2.770 
0.890 
2.404 1.530 
0.383 
0.011 
0.190 
0.006 
Entire Defense Department: 
Retired Military Personnel 
Family Housing 
4.390 1.015 
0.729 0.427 
SOURCES: Executive Office of the President of the 
United States, The Budget of the United States, 1975 and 
The Budget of the United States 1965. (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office), Part 5. 
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budget. The Federal Real and Personal Property Inventory 
Reports do not explicitly include either of these budget 
categories in the appraisal of Defense property. In fact, 
the DoD inventory evolves only from the accumulated procure¬ 
ment and Construction budgets as these specify the sum of 
acquisition costs of systems obtained. Since the present 
research relies heavily on these reports, the treatment of 
the 0 & M and RDT&E budgets is important. 
An implicit assumption of the research is that the 0 & 
M budgets are used to maintain systems in their original 
condition. Thus, 0 & M funds offset physical depreciation. 
By assuming this, the practice of appraising systems at their 
acquisition cost becomes a valid procedure—so long as these 
acquisition values are converted to constant dollars. While 
not stated explicitly, the inventory value of DoD property 
as shown in the Congressional reports must include this same 
assumption to have meaning, for depreciation does not enter 
the reports. 
While 0 & M expenditures are implicitly reflected in 
the appraisal of defense systems and therefore in the re- 
search results, RDT&E funds are not. Neither the Federal 
Real and Personal Property Inventory Reports (hereafter 
called PPR's) nor the present research, include RDT&E ex¬ 
penditures explicitly. In the case of the research, this 
is because R & D expenditures are not only impossible to 
realistically attribute to hardware systems, but they often 
cannot even be attributed to a timeframe. That is, it is 
virtually impossible to assign year t^ expenditures to year 
tj system delivery. 
While not completely satisfactory, RDT&E expenditures 
can be arbitrarily assumed to affect technical progress and, 
as was offered in Chapter V, to affect the bias of technical 
progress through factor price inducement. However, for the 
purposes of this appendix, it is only important to remember 
that the tables presented do not include RDT&E expenditures. 
Table 8 is provided to give some indication of the relative 
sizes of RDT&E and O&M budgets versus Procurement budgets. 
As another item, Military Construction budgets are ab¬ 
stracted from the research. This can be justified for two 
reasons. First, military construction applies to structures 
relatively permanent compared to the 20 year time frame con¬ 
sidered. This makes construction resemble a fixed cost which 
would not affect the results significantly. Second, con¬ 
struction is a relatively small budget category. This would 
imply that the research results are not sensitive to changes 
in construction budgets within the range of interest. 
Some comments on the categorization of data in terms of 
Navy vs. Marine Corps, and in terms of the hardware categor¬ 
ies are appropriate. The Navy was chosen as the service of 
interest partly because it is least susceptible to large man- 
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TABLE 8 — Operations and Maintenance (O&M) and Research, 
Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) Expenditures for 
Selected Years (Billions of Current Dollars) 
Fiscal 
Year 
O&M 
(1) 
RDT&E 
(2) 
Procurement 
(3) 
1957 2.45 0.52 3.41 
8 2.57 0.62 4.35 
9 2.61 0.80 3.53 
1960 2.59 0.77 3.68 
1 2.69 1.19 4.55 
2 2.87 1.30 5.07 
3 2.86 1.43 6.40 
4 2.89 1.58 5.73 
1965 3.17 1.29 4.78 
6 3.79 1.41 5.08 
7 4.68 1.79 6.07 
8 4.73 2.00 7.20 
9 5.34 2.05 7.74 
1970 5.11 2.08 7.35 
1 5.07 2.40 6.95 
2 5.31 2.43 6.99 
3 5.20 2.40 6.81 
4 (5.96) (2.57) (6.98) 
SOURCES: Executive Office of the President of the 
United States, The Budget of the United States (Washington, 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, Annual). Part 5. 
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power fluctuations during war periods. While the Navy prin¬ 
cipally continues its missions at sea during conflicts, and 
must do so largely with the systems it has when conflicts 
begin, the Marine Corps has huge fluctuations in ground 
forces between peace and war. These fluctuations would tend 
to distort the hardware/manpower ratios in the Navy Depart¬ 
ment (which includes both the Navy and Marine Corps) since 
ships, for example, would remain relatively constant. Ab¬ 
stracting the Marine Corps from the PPR‘s (Personal Property 
Reports), which combine the two services in most categories, 
is therefore essential. The inaccuracies resulting from 
attempts to allocate asset categories to the Navy or Marine 
Corps are considered less serious than the confounding effects 
of including both services in the analysis. The asset cate¬ 
gories used necessarily match those provided in the PPR’s— 
the only comprehensive source of data available publicly 
on Defense asset values by any measure. 
A summary of the aims of the appendix based on the above 
can be provided. The data relating to undercosting of man¬ 
power and hardware (hypothesis 1) is discussed in Chapter IV, 
and the data presented here is straightforward. The data 
on hypothesis 2 in its raw form is not suitable to the needs 
of the research and needs conversion. The hardware valua¬ 
tions are based on acquisition cost in current dollars and 
combine Navy and Marine Corps assets. In this appendix the 
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valuations are converted to replacement costs at constant 
dollars with the Marine Corps extracted. The manpower levels 
in raw form are available in actual on-liand manpower. These 
must be converted to estimates for manpower implicitly re¬ 
quired by the weapon systems on hand. 
A.3 Notational Comments Applying to All Tables 
— Data elements which were not available in the course 
of the research, but which could be reasonably estimated 
either from interpolations, trends, or other means are en¬ 
closed in parentheses when presented in the table proper. 
Thus, the 1968 element below is estimated while the 1967 and 
1969 entries are not: 
1967 31.3 
1968 (32.4) 
1969 33.5 
— Data elements which were not available and which 
either could not be reasonably estimated or did not need to 
be estimated for the research purposes are indicated by a 
double hyphen. Thus the 1955 element below was not available: 
1955 
1956 3.2 
1957 9.1 
— All table entries are rounded to the number of digits 
shown. However, calculations are made prior to rounding. 
Therefore, arithmetic operations specified in the table notes, 
such as column summing or multiplying, may not exactly yield 
the results shown. 
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A.4 Tables and Comments Specific to Tables 
Comments on Table 9: 
The price index "hardware average," column (4), is an 
average of the Durable Goods index and the Machinery & 
Equipment index. Ships, service craft, and plant equipment 
costs seem more likely to follow the (wholesale) Machinery 
and Equipment index while avionics, supplies, and other 
equipments seem more properly associated with the Durable 
Goods index. The aggregate index is therefore obtained by 
weighting the Durable Goods index with the sum of columns 
(2) and (4) of Table 13, and the Machinery & Equipment index 
by the sum of columns (1) and (3) of the same table. 
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TABLE 9 — Price Indices for Selected Categories of Goods 
Related to Defense Procurement and Compensation (1967 = 100) 
Fiscal 
Year 
Compensa¬ 
tion 
(1) 
Durable 
Goods 
(2) 
Mach & 
Equip. 
(3) 
Hardware 
Average 
(4) 
(v;/r) 
(1) T (4) 
(5) 
1955 82.8 75.7 79.3 .89 
6 74.2 88.3 81.8 85.0 .845 
7 74.3 91.2 87.6 89.4 .83 
8 75.6 92.1 89.4 90.8 .83 
9 79.5 94.2 91.3 92.6 .86 
1960 79.5 94.2 92.0 92.8 .86 
1 81. 3 93.7 91.9 92.5 .88 
2 81.3 93.4 92.0 92.5 .88 
3 82.1 93.4 92.2 92.7 .89 
4 87.6 94.7 92.8 93.5 .94 
1965 91.3 95.9 93.9 94.6 .96 
6 96.1 98.1 96.8 97.2 .99 
7 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.00 
8 103.8 103.4 103.2 103.3 1.00 
9 110.2 107.9 106.5 107.0 1.03 
1970 123.6 112.4 111.4 111.7 1.11 
1 131.4 117.0 115.5 116.0 1.13 
2 148.6 121.1 117.9 119.1 1.25 
3 165.8 127.9 121.7 124.1 1.34 
4 (192.0) 150.0 137.2 142.1 1.36 
SOURCES: Columns (2) and (3) from U.S. Department of 
Commerce/ Bureau of Economic Analysis, Business Statistics; 
The Biennial Supplement to the Survey of Current Business 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, September 
1973) , pp. 44-49 for 1950 thru 1972. 1973 and on from Sur¬ 
vey of Current Business, December 1974, Table 5-8. 
Column {I! is column (4) of Table 10 converted to 1967= 
100 base. 
Column (4) is a weighted average of columns (2) and (3). 
(w/r)* represents the ratio of price indices in year t 
to those in year 1967, ie, (w/r)* = (w/r) / (w/r) See 
equation (11) . 
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Comments on Table 10: 
Since approximately one-third of the personnel costs in 
DoD are for civilians, then any attempt to isolate manpower 
costs from hardware costs must include civilian as well as 
military manpower. The overall pay index weights the mili¬ 
tary and civilian indices by the relative numbers of each 
employed. 
Regular military compensation is directly available in 
the table's source from 1964 on. Prior to 1964 only base pay 
indices are available for military personnel. The source 
states, however, that a 4% rise in base pay equates very 
closely to a 3% rise in military compensation because fringe 
benefits, which amount to approximately 30% of compensation, 
have changed more slowly than base pay. The note to the table 
specified how the pre-1964 data is converted to compensation 
data 
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TABLE 10 — Military, Civilian and Overall Defense Pay In¬ 
dices for Selected Years (1964 = 100) 
Fiscal 
Year 
Regular 
Military 
Compensation 
(1) 
Classified 
Civilian 
Salaries 
(2) 
Fraction 
Civilian 
(3) 
Overall 
Compensation 
Index 
(4) 
1955 83.4 74.7 0.325 80.6 
6 87.7 78.4 0.320 84.7 
7 87.7 78.4 0.315 84.8 
8 88.1 82.3 0.315 86.3 
9 92.8 86.3 0.310 90.8 
1960 92.8 86.3 0.305 90.8 
1 92.8 92.9 0.300 92.8 
2 92.8 92.9 0.290 92.9 
3 92.8 96.5 0.285 93.8 
4 100.0 100.0 0.280 100.0 
1965 103.6 106.3 0.275 104.3 
6 101.1 109.2 0.275 109.8 
7 114.5 113.3 0.280 114.2 
8 119.2 117.1 0.280 118.6 
9 126.4 124.2 0.285 v 125.8 
1970 141.9 139.6 0.290 141.2 
1 151.0 147.9 0.300 150.1 
2 175.5 156.4 0.305 169.7 
3 200.6 164.5 0.300 189.4 
4 
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Defense (Comptroller), The 
Economics of Defense Spending A Look at the Realities (Wash¬ 
ington, D.C. : Government Printing Office, July 1972), 
Tables 15-3 and 15-4. 
NOTES: Column (1) figures prior to 1964 derived from 
source, table 15-3 using formula 100-3/4(100-i(t)); where 
i(t) is military pay index from that table. 
Column (4) is average of columns (1) and (2), weighted 
by ratios of civilian and military personnel as reflected 
in column (3). 
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Comments on Table 11: 
The series (h/m) is presented, and is estimated by an 
empirical mutation of equation (10) of Chapter III (section 
III.2.3). In that expression the bracketed term [K (l-6)+R ] 
w L* 
is the hardware in stock in period t which is carried forward 
to period t+1. Calling this amount H*+^, and realizing that 
the amount of old hardware carried forward to t+1 must equal 
the total amount on hand at the end of t+1 less the new hard¬ 
ware obtained during t+1, it follows that H*+1 = - h*, 
where h* is new equipment, approximated by total procurement 
expenditures in period t. Alternatively, H* = - h*_^. 
Equation (10) then can be written 
(H/M).H -(H/M) ,H* 
(h/m). 1 = - • (10") 
u-r nt-l 
Each of these quantities is included in the table. h*__^ 
obtained in Table 12 and derives from procurement budgets in 
the U.S. Budget. The following diagram may be helpful. 
- 
J 
h* 
nt-1 
time *t-l period t-1 
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TAELE 11 — Determination of Imputed Incremental Hardware-to- 
Manpower Ratio h/m (Dollar Figures in Millions of 1967 
Dollars) 
Fiscal 
Year 
<H/M) t 
(1) 
Kt 
(2) 
ht-l Ht=Ht"ht-l 
(3) (4) 
(h/m) 
(5) 
1955 (45.17) (44. 40) 3.54 — — 
6 44.87 43. 30 3.59 39.71 41.55 
7 42.25 40. 73 3.79 36.94 16.71 
8 39.78 38. 83 4.78 34.05 22.19 
9 39.85 38. 02 3.78 34.24 40.48 
1960 44.95 42. 07 3.94 38.13 94.31 
1 47.35 44. 27 4.90 39.37 66.63 
2 50.49 49. 28 5.40 43.88 76.01 
3 53.88 52. 32 6.89 45.43 76.23 
4 55.18 54. 68 6.10 48.58 65.53 
1965 56.88 55. 69 5.02 50.67 74.01 
6 54.41 58. 06 5.20 52.86 29.30 
7 55.47 61. 74 6.08 55.66 65.17 
8 58.30 63. 31 6.96 56.35 81.21 
9 57.12 61. 52 7.20 54.32 48.22 
1970 60.21 58. 22 6.55 51.67 84.59 
1 63.61 56. 36 5.97 50.39 92.31 
2 62.99 53. 67 5.82 47.85 57.89 
3 62.67 52. 64 5.42 47.22 59.88 
4 61.98 51. 13 4.78 46.35 55.29 
2JOTES: Column (1) is the same as column (1) of Table 5 
and column (2) is from: Table 13. Column (3) is derived in 
Table 12. Column (5) is obtained as explained in the text 
immediately preceding this table. 
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Comments on Table 13: 
Data for the table was not available for fiscal 1955. 
Consequently H for 1955 was obtained by multiplying the 
1956 entry by the ratio of Capital Stock in 1955 to that 
in 1956, as determined in a Rand report [86, first unnumbered 
table]. The values were 186.0 and 181.4 respectively, yield¬ 
ing the 44.4 figure here. 
134 
TABLE 13 — Estimated Total Property Value of U.S. Navy 
Hardware (Billions of 1967 Dollars) 
Fiscal 
Year 
Ships Aircraft/ 
Missiles 
Svce Craft 
& Plant 
Equip. 
Supplies 
& Other 
Equip. 
Total 
(Ht) 
1955“ — — — — — “(44.4) 
6 15.3 3.67 7.0 17.3 43.3 
7 14.4 3.55 6.37 16.4 40.7 
8 14.5 3.94 (5.76) (14.6) (38.8) 
9 15.7 4.01 5.39 12.9 38.0 
1960 20.9 3.97 5.55 11.6 42.1 
1 24.1 4.06 4.82 11.3 44.3 
2 27.6 4.72 (4.76) (12.2) (49.3) 
3 28.5 5.93 4.65 13.2 52.3 
4 30.6 6.32 4.99 12.8 54.7 
1965 31.9 7.31 (4.48) (12.0) (55.7) 
6 35.3 7.32 4.18 11. 3 58.1 
7 38.1 7.80 (4.14) (11.7) (61.7) 
8 38.3 8.72 4.28 12.0 63.3 
9 36.3 9.46 (4.26) (11.5) (61.5) 
1970 31.9 10.83 4.42 11.1 58.2 
1 30.6 11.01 (4.65) (10.1) (56.4) 
2 28.9 10.6 4.95 9.22 53.7 
3 27.8 11.0 (4.88) (8.96) (52.6) 
4 26.7 10.9 4.83 8.70 51.1 
NOTES: 1955 total based on relative size of 1955 to 1956 
capital stock ratio in [86] times 1956 value above. Column 
(1) is from Table 14, column (2) from Table 17, column (3) 
from Ta.ble 20, and column (4) from Table 22. 
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Comments on Table 14: 
Ships represent the largest fraction of Defense proper¬ 
ty. Their appraised value is therefore important. From the 
standpoint of hardware/manpower ratios, inactive ships (those 
in "mothballs") should be excluded from the analysis. The 
appraised value of the inventory should furthermore represent 
a replacement cost. Applying the price index for the year of 
ship acquisition rather than the year of appraisal, and 
applying this only to the active ships, yields a reasonable 
proxy for a measure of ship value in 1967 terms. The assump¬ 
tion that 0 & M funds maintain the active ships in original 
condition is basic to the 1967 evaluation. 
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TABLE 14 — Estimated Property Value of All U. S. Navy Ships 
(Columns (1) and (5) in Billions of Dollars) 
Fiscal 
Year 
/acquisition 
Cost 
(1) 
Fraction 
Active 
(2) 
Ship Age 
(Years) 
(3) 
Index 
(4) 
Value in 
1967 $ 
(5) 
1956 19.8 0.36 10.0 46.5 15.3 
7 20.5 0.36 10.2 51.3 14.4 
8 21.8 0.37 10.6 55.5 14.5 
9 21.5 0.43 10.9 58.7 15.8 
1960 22.1 0.53 12.5 55.9 20.9 
1 22.6 0.62 13.0 58.2 24.1 
2 23.3 0.69 14.0 58.2 27.6 
3 24.5 0.69 14.6 59.3 28.5 
4 26.3 0.70 15.3 60.2 30.6 
1965 27.7 0.71 15.7 61.6 31.9 
6 29.1 0.75 16.6 61.8 35.3 
7 30.0 0.79 17.4 62.2 38.1 
8 31.3 0.80 17.7 65.3 38.3 
9 32.0 0.80 17.7 70.6 36.3 
1970 32.2 0.71 17.4 71.6 31.9 
1 33.9 0.66 17.2 73.0 30.6 
2 34.7 0.64 16.8 76.9 28.9 
3 35.1 0.68 16.3 85.9 27.8 
4 35.3 (0.68) 15.7 90.0 26.7 
NOTES: Column (1) is from Table 25, column (2) is 
from Table 15, column (3) is from Table 16. 
Index (column (4)) is the price index relative to 1967 
for wholesale machinery and equipment for the year of 
acquisition for the average ship. Thus if ship ace is A 
in year t, then index is for year t-A from tables 5-8 of 
the Survey of Current Business [69]. 
Column (5) is obtained by multiplying (1) by (2), and 
converting product to 1567 terms through index of column (4). 
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Comments on Table 15: 
The purpose of the table is to yield R^_, the "Fraction 
Active" of all ships for year t. If the total replacement 
cost in year t of all ships (active and inactive) is Enw, 
then R^Enw represents the replacement cost in year t of the 
active ships. The weighting factor w for each ship type 
mainly is based on relative ship tonnage, but has an adjust¬ 
ment based on building cost. This adjustment reflects the 
author's estimates of relative building cost per ship-ton 
of tlie various types. Thus a submarine of the same tonnage 
as a surface ship may cost twice as much to build due to 
the extra costs of submergence capabilities. The w's are 
meant to be representative of the broad spectrum of ship 
classes within each ship type. They are therefore rela¬ 
tively crude, but considered adequate for the overall 
sensitivity inherent in R^. 
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Comments on Table 16: 
The data is based on evidence provided in 1965 by 
Admiral E. P. Holmes to the Congress in his capacity as 
Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Fleet. It represents 
data accumulated on Atlantic Fleet ships only, with ships 
unweighted by size or value. It is also based on the time 
the ship was built, and does not account for new equipments 
installed since ship commissioning. 
The assumption is made in the present research that 
the ages of Atlantic Fleet ships are representative of the 
entire U.S. Navy, that the unweighted age average is repre¬ 
sentative of the true average age, and that ship improve¬ 
ments have been negligible compared to initial procurement 
cost when compared in constant dollars. 
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TABLE 16 — Estimated Average Age of U.S. Naval Ships in 
Years as of End of Fiscal Years 
Fiscal 
Year 
Average 
Age 
Fiscal 
Year 
Average 
Age 
1950 5.5 1965 15.7 
1 6.3 6 16.6 
2 7.1 7 17.4 
3 8.6 8 17.7 
4 8.9 9 17.7 
1955 S. 5 1970 (17.4) 
6 10.0 1 (17.2) 
7 10.2 2 (16.8) 
8 10.6 3 (16.3) 
9 10.9 4 (15.7) 
1960 12.5 1977 (12.7) 
1 13.0 
2 14.0 1980 11.4 
3 14.6 
4 15.3 1985 12.9 
SOURCE NOTES: For 1950-64, source is U.S. Congress, 
House, Status of Naval Ships. Hearings Before the Special 
Committee on Sea Power of the Committee on Armed Services 
[65]. 
For 1980 and 1984, source is Department of Defense, 
"Secretary of Defense James A. Schlesinger Annual Defense 
Department Report FY 1965" [71]. 
1970-74 and 1977 are linear interpolations between 
1969 data and 1980 estimate. 
146 
TABLE 17 — Estimated Property Value of Navy Aircraft, Air¬ 
craft Support Equipment, Missiles, and Ammunition not 
Accounted for in Navy Supply (Billions of Dollars) 
Fiscal 
Year 
Acquisition 
Cost 
(1) 
Fraction 
Active 
(2) 
Index 
(t-5) 
(3) 
Value in 
1967 $ 
(4) 
1956 3.3 (0.78) 70.2 3.67 
7 3.5 (0.78) 77.0 3.55 
8 3.9 (0.78) 77.3 3.94 
9 4.0 0.79 78.8 4.01 
1960 4.0 0.79 79.6 3.97 
1 4.2 (0.80) 82.8 4.06 
2 5.15 (0.81) 88.3 4.72 
3 6.6 (0.82) 91.2 5.93 
4 7.1 (0.83) 91.1 6.32 
1965 8.3 0.83 94.2 7.31 
6 8.1 (0.85) 94.1 7.32 
7 8.3 (0.88) 93.7 7.80 
8 8.95 0.91 93.4 8.72 
9 9.5 0.93 93.4 9.46 
1970 11.14 0.92 94.7 10.83 
1 (12.0) 0.88 95.9 11.01 
2 12.1 0.86 98.1 10.06 
3 (12.35) 0.89 100.0 11.0 
4 12.45 (0.89) 101.7 10.9 
NOTES: Column (1) is from column (5) of Table 24. 
Column (2) is from Table 18. 
The average age of Navy tactical aircraft in 1975 is 
approximately 5.3 years [71, p. 219], Because of aircraft 
turnover rates, a 5 year average age is assumed throughout, 
thus the index used to convert assets held year t to 1967 
equivalents, is the index for year t-5. The durable goods 
index from Table 9 is used, extended to include pre-1955 
dates. 
The fraction active by number of aircraft in Table 18 
is assumed bo be equal to the fraction active by normalized 
acquisition cost in this table. 
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TABLE 18 — Navy and Marine Corps Combined Total Aircraft, 
Selected Years 
Fiscal Total 
Year Active 
(1) 
Total Ratio of Active 
Inactive to Total Aircraft 
(2) (3) 
1955 12,763 3,677 0.78 
6 — — (0.78) 
7 — — (0.78) 
8 -- — (0.78) 
9 —— -— (0.79) 
1960 8,848 2,406 0.79 
1 — — (0.80) 
2 — (0.81) 
3 — — (0.82) 
4 —— — (0.82) 
1965 8,002 1,668 0.83 
6 — — (0.85) 
7 — — (0.88) 
8 8,448 834 0.91 
9 8,468 680 0.93 
1970 7,893 717 0.92 
1 7,299 966 0.88 
2 6,732 1,084 0.86 
3 6,716 857 0.89 
4 — -- (0.89) 
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the 
Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1974, 
(95th Edition) (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 
Office, 1974), Table No. 506. 
NOTE: The breakdwon of active vs. inactive aircraft 
has not been available from other sources, and earlier 
editions of the source document contaon no such data for 
the missing years. The source references U.S. Department 
of Defense, Office of the Secretary, unpublished data as 
the base source. 
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TABLE 19 — Estimated Fraction of Combined Navy 
Corps Tactical Aircraft Belonging to Navy Only, 
of Aircraft Totals 
and Marine 
by Weight 
Selected 
Years 
Navy 
Fraction 
Prior 1961 0.65 (estimated) 
1961 0.66 
1964 0.68 
1968 0.62 
1972 0.70 
1974 0.70 
SOURCE: William D. White, U.S. Tactical Air power. 
Missions, Forces, and Costs, (Washington, D.C. : Brookings 
Institution, [T9T4], p. 18, table 3-3. 
The data collected in the source are specifically for 
tactical aircraft. The present research assumes the ratios 
for tactical aircraft are representative of all aircraft. 
r* 
V 
TABLE 20 — Estimated Property Value of Service Craft and 
Plant Equipment in U.S. Navy, Conversion to 1967 Dollars 
(Billions) 
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Fiscal 
Year 
Plant 
Equip. 
(1) 
Service 
Craft 
(2) 
Total 
(3) 
Index 
(t-10) 
(4) 
Est. Value 
in 1967 $ 
(5) 
1956 2.26 1.0 3.26 46.5 7.01 
7 2.42 1.0 33.42 53.7 6.37 
8 (2.37) (0.98) (3.35) 58.2 (5.76) 
9 2.32 0.97 3.29 61.0 5.39 
1960 2.54 0.96 3.50 63.1 5.55 
1 2.47 0.93 3.40 70.5 4.82 
2 (2.47) 0.89 (3.36) 70.6 (4.76) 
3 2.48 0.88 3.36 72.2 4.65 
4 2.46 1.20 3.66 73.4 4.99 
1965 (2.49) 0.90 (3.39) 75.7 (4.48) 
6 2.52 0.90 3.42 81.8 4.18 
7 (2.72) 0.91 (3.63) 87.6 (4.14) 
8 2.92 0.91 3.83 89.4 4.28 
9 (3.02) 0.87 (3.89) 91.3 (4.26) 
1970 3.12 0.95 4.07 92.0 4.42 
1 (3.29) 0.98 (4.27) 91.9 (4.65) 
2 3.45 1.10 4.55 92.0 4.95 
3 (3.46) 1.04 (4.50) 92.2 (4.88) 
4 3.48 1.00 4.48 92.8 4.83 
SOURCE NOTES: Columns (1) and (2) from Table 21 and 
column (2) of Table 25 respectively. 
The "Service Craft" column of the table is obtained 
directly from the combined Navy and Marine Corps data of 
Table 25 since no adjustment to extract the Marine Corps 
from this category is considered necessary. The prepon¬ 
derance of service craft (tugs, lighters, etc.) in the 
Navy Department are Navy craft. 
TABLE 21 — Estimated Values of U.S. Navy Plant Equipment 
Exclusive of Marine Corps valued at Acquisition Cost 
(Billions of Dollars) 
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Fiscal 
Year 
Navy Plant 
Equip. 
Fiscal 
Year 
Navy Plant 
Equip. 
1955 — 1965 — 
6 2.26 6 2.52 
7 2.42 7 — 
8 — 8 2.92 
9 2.32 9 — 
1960 2.54 1970 3.12 
1 2.47 1 — 
2 — 2 3.45 
3 2.48 3 — 
4 2.46 4 3.48 
NOTE: Navy Plant Equipment is obtained by multiplying 
column (5) of Table 26 by corresponding element of Table 31. 
Data isolating Navy and Marine Corp data on plant 
equipment is not available, and it must therefore be arbi¬ 
trarily assigned. It was decided to utilize the ratio of 
Navy personnel to Marine Corps personnel to accomplish this. 
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TABLE 22 — Estimated Value of Equipment and Supplies in 
U.S. Navy Supply System (Billions of Dollars) 
Fiscal Equip. & Supplies Index Value in 
Year in Current $ (t-1) 1967 $ 
(1) (2) (3) 
1956 14.35 82.8 17.33 
7 14.49 88.3 16,41 
8 — 91.7 (14.6) 
9 11.85 29.1 12.87 
1960 10.97 94.2 11.65 
1 10.67 94.1 11.29 
2 — S3.7 (12.2) 
3 12.37 93.4 13.24 
4 11.93 93.4 12.77 
1965 — — 94.7 (12.0) 
6 10.80 95.9 11.26 
7 98.1 (11.7) 
8 12.01 100.0 12.01 
9 — — 103.4 (11-5) 
1970 11.94 107.9 (11.07) 
1 — 112.4 (10.1) 
2 11.16 117.0 9.54 
3 — 121.1 ( 9.12) 
4 11.13 127.9 8.70 
NOTES: Column (1) is obtained from Table 23 . Index 
is index for durable goods, Table 9. Assumption that goods 
in Supply System have average age of one year leads to 
using index for year t-1 instead of t to convert to 1967 
dollars. The use of the one year average age is an arbi- 
trary estimate. 
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TABLE 23 — Navy Fraction of Total Annual Navy/Marine Corps 
Supply Assets (Dollars in Billions) 
Fiscal 
Year 
Navy 
Supplies ($) 
(1) 
Marine Corps 
Supplies ($) 
(2) 
Navy Fraction 
(l)*((l) + (2)) 
(3) 
1956 14.35 1.84 0.89 
7 14.49 1.68 0.90 
8 — — (0.89) 
9 11.85 1.42 0.89 
1960 10.97 1.49 0.88 
1 10.62 1.86 0.85 
2 — — (0.87) 
3 12.37 1.42 0.90 
4 11.93 1.51 0.89 
1965 — •U* M*. (0.89) 
6 10.80 1.34 0.89 
7 — —— (0.88) 
8 12.01 1.56 0.88 
9 — (0.87) 
1970 11.94 2.12 0.85 
1 — — (0.85) 
2 11.16 2.11 0.84 
3 — — (0.84) 
4 11.13 2.19 0.84 
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Real and 
Personal Property of the Department of Defense (Ann7al), 
Part II, Section A. 
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Coiranent on Table 24: 
The categories in the table are estimates for the Navy 
only portions of the corresponding categories of Table 25. 
The extraction of Marine Corps components is accomplished 
by assuming that the Navy fraction of these categories 
matches the Navy fraction of total assets held in the com¬ 
bined Navy and Marine Corps supply systems — information 
which is directly available from the Federal Real and Per¬ 
sonal Property Inventory Reports (PPRs). 
The zero elements in columns (2) , (3), and (4) result 
because early versions of the Real and Personal Property 
Reports accounted for these items elsewhere, principally 
under the "Equipment in Supply" or "Equipment Other than 
Production" categories (see, for example, Tables 25 and 26). 
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TABLE 24 — Estimated Values 
Peoperty Exclusive of Marine 
Cost (Billions of Dollars) 
of Selected U.S. Navy Seapon 
Corps, Valued at Acquisition 
Active & Aircraft Missiles Ammo Total 
Fiscal Inactive Support Not in Not in 
Year Aircraft Equip. Supply Supplv 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
1956 3.3 0 0 0 3.3 
7 3.5 0 0 0 3.5 
8 3.9 0 0 0 3.9 
9 4.0 0 0 0 4.0 
1960 4.0 0 0 0 4.0 
1 4.2 0 0 0 4.2 
2 5.15 0 0 0 5.15 
3 6.12 0.44 0.2 0 6.58 
4 6.05 0.49 0.59 0 7.13 
1965 7.14 0.51 0.66 0 8.31 
6 6.63 0.51 0.97 0 8.11 
7 6.88 0.51 0.93 0 8.32 
8 7.32 0.52 0.80 0.31 8.95 
9 7.50 0.51 0.87 0.61 9.49 
1970 8.58 0.65 1.11 0.80 11.14 
1 9.28 0.98 — 0.77 — 
2 9.73 0.92 0.78 0.65 12.08 
3 9.29 0.96 — 0.62 — 
4 10.29 0.97 0.66 0.53 12.45 
NOTES: Columns (1) and (2) obtained by multiplying 
columns (3) and (4) of Table 25 by nearest value from Table 
19. 
Columns (3) and (4) obtained by multiplying columns 
(4) and (5) of Table 25 by corresponding elements of Table 
23. 
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Comments on Table 25: 
The comment regarding zero elements made in the last 
table apply equally here. While the Federal Real and Per¬ 
sonal Property Inventory Reports are not specific, it is 
apparent that "Equipment Other than Production" after I960 
was partly included in "Plant Equipment" (see Table 26) and 
partly to "Aircraft Support Equipment." These redesigna¬ 
tions do not seriously effect the research results since in 
the aggregate, all categories are included, however rede¬ 
signated. 
The columns of Table 25 sum, within rounding error, to 
column (4) of Table 26, and represent weapons in use by the 
Navy at acquisition cost. 
Column (4) of the table combines two categories in the 
source. These are there called "Spare Aircraft Engines" 
and "Ground Support Equipment." 
4 
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Comment on Table 26: 
This table is presented to show the categories of 
assets contained in the Federal Real and Personal Property 
Inventory Reports (PPRs) and their respective magnitudes. 
When attempting to obtain hardware/manpower ratios of De¬ 
fense Systems, it would be ideal to include all categories. 
However, all categories cannot be realistically included. 
Real property is excluded for several reasons. First, land 
can hardly be evaluated at replacement cost, nor does land 
effect in any measurable way the intrinsic hardware/manpower 
ratios of weapon systems. Buildings and facilities have a 
more direct effect, but one that again is not realistically 
measurable. For purposes of the present research, it seems 
more appropriate to treat such real property as fixed in 
time, and concentrate on the changes in hardware/manpower 
implicit in the more transitory components, namely weapon 
units. 
Construction in progress is assumed to maintain the 
Real property at its necessary fixed level. The net re¬ 
sult is that columns (1) and (2) of Table 26 are abstracted 
from the study. One can argue that under certain condi¬ 
tions, some buildings (such as aircraft hangers), cause 
changes in hardware/manpower ratios by making certain equip¬ 
ments unnecessary (e.g., the hangars allow using ordinary 
tools instead of expensive waterproof tools). It is assumed 
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in this research that such effects are negligible—especial¬ 
ly since plant equipment is retained in the study and only 
the empty buildings are abstracted. 
Industrial funds (column (6)) are excluded since they 
serve only as a transfer account, and furthermore are small 
in magnitude. Excess/surplus property is excluded from the 
hardware total since it is not manned. This treatment is 
similar to that given inactive ships. Finally, Disposed 
Ships (column (8)) are included in the active/inactive ship 
account in the PPR’s. They are retained since they are 
ships in process of being dismantled, and therefore require 
manpower hours assumed commensurate with active units. 
It should be stressed that the main property categories 
included in the study, i.e. columns (3) through (5), account 
for the preponderence of Defense assets. The research re¬ 
sults should therefore not be overly degraded by the few 
required exceptions. 
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Comment on Table 27: 
The results of the table derive from adjusting the com¬ 
bined Military and Civilian levels of Table 28 with the 
Equivalent Manning Level (EML) of Table 29. The ratio of 
required manpower to actual manpower was not available for 
officer or civilian personnel. It is therefore assumed that 
the EML for Navy enlisted personnel is representative of 
these other categories. 
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TABLE 27 — Estimated Manpower Requirements for Weapon Hard¬ 
ware Held by U.S. Navy (Thousands of Persons) 
Fiscal 
Year 
Estimated 
Manpower (M^) 
Fiscal 
Year 
Estimated 
Manpower (M^) 
1955 983 1965 979 
6 965 6 1,067 
7 964 7 1,113 
8 976 8 1,086 
9 954 9 1,078 
1960 936 1970 967 
1 935 1 886 
2 976 2 852 
3 971 3 840 
4 991 4 825 
NOTE: Estimated manpower is column (4) of Table 28 
divided by column (3) of Table 29 • 
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TABLE 28 — Navy Manpower Categories for Selected Years 
(Thousands of Persons, End of Fiscal Year) 
Fiscal 
Year 
Active 
Navy 
Military 
(1) 
Navy & 
Marine Corps 
Civilians 
(2) 
Estimated 
Navy 
Civilians 
(3) 
Navy Civilian 
& 
Military 
(4) = (1) + (3) 
1952 — 481 347 — 
1955 661 —— (322) (983) 
6 (660) — (304) (965) 
7 (655) — (299) (954) 
8 641 — (295) (931) 
9 626 — (280) (906) 
1960 618 348 271 889 
1 627 (348) 271 (898) 
2 666 348 271 937 
3 665 344 268 933 
4 668 333 259 927 
1965 672 330 257 929 
6 (745) 354 262 1,007 
7 751 403 290 1,041 
8 765 416 295 1,060 
9 777 424 301 1,078 
1970 692 376 275 967 
1 623 350 263 886 
2 588 342 256 844 
3 564 322 (242) 806 
4 551 326 (245) 796 
SOURCES: Department of the Navy, Office of the Comp¬ 
troller "Budget and Forces Summary" NAVSO P-3502 (Washing¬ 
ton, D.C.: May 1974). Office of the Assistant Secreatry of 
Defense (Comptroller) "Five Year Defense Program Historical 
Summary for Fiscal Years, 1962-1972," Memorandum dated June 
7, 1973, unclassified portions, table 2 (Computer Printout). 
Roger N. Little (ed.), Handbook of Military Institutions 
(Beverly Hills, CA. : Sage Publications, 19 71) Appendix” De¬ 
partment of Defense, Secretary of Defense James R. Schlds- 
singer Annual Defense Department Report 1975 (W ashing ton", 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, March 1974) p. 172. 
NOTE: Column (3) is product of column (2) and elements 
of Table 31 except 1952 entry is based on assumed equivalence 
(in Navy to total Navy and Marine Corps ratio) of 1952 and 
1967, which are both peak war years. 
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Comment on Table 29: 
The Equivalent Manning Level (EML) for enlisted per¬ 
sonnel was derived through the following rationale. The end 
intent is to deduce the hardware/manpower ratio for Navy 
systems. This ratio is to be compared with the ratio of 
manpower costs to hardware costs in order to determine De¬ 
fense efficiency. Given weapon levels through time, man¬ 
power levels required to man those weapons must be obtained. 
However, available manpower data is actual manpower levels 
rather than required levels. Furthermore actual levels 
are often distorted by non-economic effects such as war-to- 
peace transition periods. To decide whether Defense pro¬ 
curement has responded to factor price changes, a conversion 
from actual manning levels to the levels required by the 
systems procured is needed. 
To do this, enlisted personnel grades were grouped into 
three sub-groups: E-l personnel, E-w and E-3 personnel, and 
E-4 through E-9 personnel. E-l personnel are essentially 
recruits, and do not man systems. E-2 and E-3 personnel 
are assumed unskilled in that they are normally not trained 
to repair equipments, though they can operate systems given 
supervision. E-4 through E-9 personnel are skilled, and 
represent the bulk of trained repairmen, supervisors, etc. 
While these classifications are oversimplified, they are 
suitable for present purposes. 
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Since E-l's are not involved in system operation, their 
manning level is temporarily disregarded. Suppose now that 
tlie E~2,3 category is manned at 120%, while the E-4,9 cate¬ 
gory is at 80%. If all manpower categories are combined, a 
manning level of about 100% results. If an equivalent man¬ 
ning level of 1.0 is therefore assumed, and the actual man¬ 
power level divided by EML is used to estimate the required 
level, then it is felt that this will be an erroneous indi¬ 
cation of the manpower required. The overage in unskilled 
personnel does not compensate for the shortage in skilled 
personnel, for the unskilled cannot perform the work of the 
skilled. 
To emphasize the point, consider the opposite case. If 
the unskilled were manned at 80%, and the skilled at 120%, 
then it seems intuitive to conclude that the overall manning 
level is more than 100% — for the skilled can do the work 
required of the unskilled (since the only way to become an 
E-4 is to have been an E-3), and usually much more, since 
they can repair equipment. 
There are unlimited ways to adjust for the manpower 
overages and shortages of Table 30 in order to arrive at an 
EML. The method chosen is the following which is arbitrary 
but intuitively consistent with the data and sensitivity of 
the research. If the E-2,3 category is manned in excess of 
100% (which it is for all years considered) it is assigned 
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a value of 1.0. This value is then averaged with the manning 
level for the E-r,9 category, the weighting being equal since 
the two groups are of approximately the same size. The aver¬ 
age figure is then the EML. This is used to convert actual 
manning levels into the Manpower Requirement levels of Table 
27. 
TABLE 29 — Estimated Equivalent Manning Level (EML) for 
U.S. Navy in Selected Years 
166 
Fiscal 
Year 
Manning Level 
E-2, E-3 
(1) 
Manning Level 
E-4, E-9 
(2) 
EML 
(3) 
1955 — — (1.0) 
1956 — — (1.00) 
1957 — — (0.99) 
1958 —— — (0.96) 
1959 1.0 0.90 0.95 
1960 1.0 0.90 0.95 
1961 1.0 0.92 0.96 
1962 1.0 0.92 0.96 
1963 1.0 0.92 0.96 
1964 1.0 0.87 0.94 
1965 1.0 0.92 0.95 
1966 1.0 0.89 0.94 
1967 1.0 0.87 0.94 
1968 1.0 0.95 0.98 
1969 1.0 1.00 1.00 
1970 1.0 1.00 1.00 
19 71 1.0 0.99 1.00 
1972 1.0 0.98 0.99 
1973 1.0 0.91 0.96 
1974 1.0 0.91 0.96 
NOTES: Column (1) is 1.0 throughout because average 
manning level for E-2, E-3 exceeds 100% each year (see Table 
30). Column (2) is weighted average of manning levels for 
E-4 through E-9 from Table 30. EML is average of columns 
(1) and (2). All figures rounded to digits shown. See text 
for further discus'sion. 
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TABLE 31 — Ratio of Navy Manpower to Total Navy and Marine 
Corps Manpower Based on Actual Manpower Levels Maintained 
for Selected Years 
Year(s) Ratio Year Ratio 
1957-61 (0.78) 1968 0.71 
1962 0.78 1969 0.71 
1963 0.78 1970 0.73 
1964 0.78 1971 0.75 
1965 0.78 1972 0.75 
1966 0.74 1973 (0.75) 
1967 0.72 1974 0.74 
SOURCE: Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) 
"Five Year Defense Program, Historical Summary for Fiscal 
Years 1962-1972," Memorandum dated June 7, 1973, unclassi¬ 
fied portions, Table 2 (Computer Printout). 


